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Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial 
Improvements Acts 
Carl Tobias* 
In this article, Professor Tobias analyzes and attempts to harmonize the 
conflicting frameworks for civil procedure reform embodied in the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) and its immediate predecessor, the Judicial 
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (JIA). Congress intended the 
JIA to open the national and local rulemaking processes to public scrutiny and 
to decrease the use of local rules. Yet Professor Tobias finds the 1990 Act at 
odds with the earlier measure in several ways. By encouraging local experi-
ments aimed at reducing litigation costs and delay, he argues, the CJRA shifted 
the locus of rulemaking toward the local level and departed from the tenets of 
simplicity, uniformity, and trans-substantivity which traditionally have un-
derlaid the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, he contends, imple-
mentation of the CJRA interrupted promising reform processes started under 
the JIA. Professor Tobias argues that we can combine the best of the JIA and 
CJRA by fostering limited local experimentation while achieving most proce-
dural revisions through notice and comment rulemaking at the national level. 
Federal court judges, lawyers, and litigants confront a bewildering array of 
civil procedures, many of which conflict or are difficult to discover, compre-
hend, and satisfy. This has happened despite three concerted efforts, including 
two attempts in the last decade, to reform the procedures and processes for 
revising them. The first reform of the twentieth century led to the promulgation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The Rules instituted a liberal, 
flexible system, which was principally intended to embody certain of its draft-
ers' tenets, namely uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity.1 That proce-
dural regime functioned well for thirty years. The system became decreasingly 
effective by the 1970s, however. Most important, the liberal, flexible nature of 
the procedural scheme was said to permit abuses collectively characterized as 
the litigation explosion. Numerous federal district courts attempted to address 
these problems with local procedures. Nonetheless, knowledgeable observers 
of federal civil litigation suggested that a national response was preferable be-
cause the districts' efforts were eroding uniformity, simplicity, and trans-sub-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan, Lauren Robel, and 
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this 
piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I am especially grateful to Ann and Tom 
Boone for their generous gift recognizing scholarship's value. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. That is, "procedure generalized across substantive lines." Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. 
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975). See generally Carl 
Tobias, The Transfonnation ofTrans·Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1501 (1992). 
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stantivity and because of the need to resolve the perceived tension between the 
restoration, maintenance, and enhancement of those tenets and the expeditious, 
inexpensive resolution of lawsuits. 
Congress responded to such challenges of modern civil litigation by passing 
two pieces of legislation: the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
of 1988 (JIA) and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA). These statutes 
conflict in numerous respects and even exacerbate certain existing procedural 
problems. This article analyzes how we reached the current state of civil proce-
dure and suggests ways to improve the procedural system. 
At the outset, it is important to understand that the 1988 and 1990 Acts had 
different sponsors and purposes. Representative Robert Kastenmeier' s House 
Judiciary Subcommittee developed the JIA over a 10-year period. Its principal 
objective apparently was to reinvigorate the major 1938 tenets of uniformity 
and simplicity by addressing directly the problem of local procedural prolifera-
tion and by modernizing and opening the processes of national and local proce-
dural revision. Senator Joseph Biden's Senate Judiciary Committee drafted the 
CJRA during a considerably shorter time, and the measure passed in the year 
that it was introduced. The CJRA's goal was to reduce cost and delay in civil 
litigation by encouraging federal districts to experiment with procedures that 
might save expense and time. That purpose fostered local procedural prolifera-
tion, thereby creating conflicts between the central objectives of the 1988 and 
1990 statutes. 
In this article, I evaluate how Congress passed these inconsistent Acts, ex-
plore each statute's strengths and weaknesses, and offer suggestions for future 
reform. In Part I, I briefly analyze the history of the Federal Rules and the 
mounting criticism of the 1938 procedural system for its increasing inability to 
efficiently resolve modern civil litigation. Part II assesses the goals and spe-
cific constituents of the two measures that Congress recently passed primarily 
in response to this criticism. Part ill discusses significant aspects of each stat-
ute's implementation, ultimately concluding that the 1990 Act effectively sus-
pended important initiatives begun under the earlier legislation. I argue that 
these interrupted initiatives appeared promising, should be reconsidered, and 
may warrant more comprehensive implementation. Part IV offers some sug-
gestions for improving federal civil procedure by capitalizing on the best fea-
tures of each measure. 
I. THE 1938 FEDERAL RULES UNDER STRESS 
Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Acts in 1988 and 1990, but 
those statutes have their origins in considerably earlier developments.2 Indeed, 
full appreciation of the legislation requires some understanding of the preced-
2. This Part draws substantially on Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Refonn and the Balkanization of 
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992). Use of the JIA in this article means Title IV of 
the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 
(1988), which is codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071-2074 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
Use of the CJRA in this article means Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), which is codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992). 
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ing half-century history of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
took effect in 1938. The initial section of this article, therefore, emphasizes the 
adoption of those Rules during the 1930s and their judicial application and 
revision over the ensuing five decades. 
A. The 1938 Federal Rules 
Charles Clark, the Reporter for the first Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules, and the members of the Committee who wrote the initial Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure intended to address the complications of common law and 
code practice and procedure.3 These attorneys meant to eliminate the highly 
technical nature of the earlier procedural schemes. 4 The lawyers intended to 
craft a set of procedures that was simple, uniform, and trans-substantive.5 The 
drafters also sought to accord counsel considerable control over litigation, espe-
cially in discovery; to encourage prompt, inexpensive dispute resolution; and to 
emphasize disposition of cases on the merits. 6 The Committee meant to attain 
simplicity by restricting the importance of pleadings and by reducing the 
number of steps in litigation.7 The drafters simultaneously sought to enhance 
uniformity by requiring that all federal district courts apply the same 
procedures. 8 
These fundamental procedural tenets were not absolutes; some of the 
precepts were in tension and could even be inconsistent. Indeed, the very first 
3. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 914-21, 926-73 (1987); Carl Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 272-75 
(1989). 
In the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to adopt procedures 
governing civil litigation in the federal district courts. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982). In 1935, the Court appointed the original 
Advisory Committee, which consisted of practicing attorneys and law professors, and the Committee 
drafted the Rules between 1935 and 1937. See Subrin, supra, at 970-73; Tobias, supra, at 273. 
4. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986); Subrin, supra note 3, at 948-73; see also Roscoe 
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, Address before the 
American Bar Association 16-19 (1906) (reprint by the American Judicature Society) (detailing the 
technical nature of earlier procedural schemes). See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE 
HANDMAID OF JuSTICE 1-84 (1965). 
5. For general authority on the intent of the drafters, see Cover, supra note l; Peter Charles 
Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation, Preliminary Notes for Decoding the Deliberations of 
the Advisory Committee that Wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 409 
(1993); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 502-
15 (1986); Tobias, supra note 3, at 272-77. But see Resnik, supra, at 498-99, 508 (discussing the 
difficulties of divining the intent of drafters who worked a half-century ago); Tobias, supra note 3, at 
274 (same). 
6. The drafters seemingly intended to enlarge judicial discretion and apparently trusted substan-
tially to judges' discretion in applying the Rules. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 923, 964, 972-73, 1001; 
Tobias, supra note 3, at 275-76 & n.28. For discussion of these and other important objectives of the 
drafters, see Resnik, supra note 5, at 502-15; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Proce-
dure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1649-51 (1981); Tobias, supra note 3, at 272-77. 
7. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 4, at 439-40; Subrin, supra note 6, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 
3, at 274. 
8. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 6, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 3, at 274-75. 
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Federal Rule, by admonishing that judges construe the Rules to "secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," manifested the phe-
nomena.9 Federal Rule 83 authorized all ninety-four federal district courts to 
promulgate local procedures, primarily to respond to local conditions, and 
thereby created considerable potential for the districts to adopt local provisions 
that would erode the uniform, simple system of civil procedure.10 The deci-
sions to institute an equity-dominated regime, by effectively merging law into 
equity, 11 and to provide a liberal, flexible procedural scheme opened federal 
court access and facilitated the pursuit of complex litigation that could impose 
significant expense and delay.12 The Rules, by according attorneys substantial 
latitude in, and judges limited control over, lawsuits, might have similarly en-
couraged unfocused litigation and expansive discovery which were expensive 
and time-consuming.13 
B. The Federal Rules' First Thirty Years 
The Advisory Committee and the federal bench sustained the essential pro-
cedural tenets during the initial three decades of the Rules' existence, and those 
Rules were well-received.14 The Advisory Committee proposed comparatively 
9. FED. R. C1v. P. 1. 
10. Rule 83 authorizes districts to adopt local rules that are "not inconsistent" with the Federal 
Rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 83; see also 28 U.S.C. § 207l(a) (1988). That limitation has been honored in the 
breach. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83 advisory committee's note; see also notes 33-48 infra and accompanying 
text. 
11. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 1000-01; Subrin, supra note 6, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 6, at 
274-75. 
12. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 501 n.30 (observing that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Federal Rules may have been more liberal than the drafters intended); see also Subrin, supra note 3, at 
1001. 
13. Part A describes certain procedural visions that apparently animated the drafters of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930s while introducing fundamental procedural tenets that underlie 
federal civil procedure and illustrating tensions among those precepts. We do not know whether all 
members of the Advisory Committee crafted the original Federal Rules with each of these tenets clearly 
in mind, much less that they precisely calculated how every procedural decision made would affect the 
tenets. Nonetheless, the Committee was certainly reacting to, and attempting to remedy, numerous 
deficiencies, such as disuniformity, complexity, and technicality, of prior procedural schemes. More-
over, the drafters probably appreciated that they were making some tradeoffs, for example, between a 
flexible, liberal procedural system premised primarily on equity and one based on law. They may corre-
spondingly have recognized that the increased judicial discretion inherent in an equity-dominated regime 
might have accorded judges too much power and could even have led to discretion's abuse. See Subrin, 
supra note 3, at 1001; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. Rev. 1463, 1470, 
1474, 1478 (1987) (book review). For additional treatment of the Committee's work in the 1930s, see 
Hoffer, supra note 5; Resnik, supra note 5; Subrin, supra note 3. 
Normative questions involving the tenets which should underlie federal civil procedure and its 
revision and how tensions between those precepts should be resolved are examined throughout this 
article. I believe that the individuals and entities that apply and revise federal procedure should en-
deavor to realize and maximize those essential procedural tenets identified above and should attempt to 
accommodate as much as possible those precepts that are inconsistent. When tensions involving the 
tenets cannot be reconciled, selection between them should be made in ways that articulate the underly-
ing value choices as forthrightly as possible. Numerous suggestions in the final Part of this article 
include my most explicit efforts to reconcile tensions involving these fundamental procedural tenets. 
14. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 515-16; Tobias, supra note 3, at 277-78. See generally Sympo-
sium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 CoLUM. L. Rev. 435 (1958). 
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few amendments, and most of these were clarifications.15 Federal judges ex-
perienced minimal difficulty applying the original Rules and lauded their effec-
tiveness.16 For example, the judiciary maintained simplicity by employing a 
general, liberal pleading regime which it enforced practically and flexibly, and 
by effectively ceding discovery to attorneys. 17 Individual judges preserved and 
promoted uniformity by adopting rather few local procedures, particularly 
avoiding measures that conflicted with the Federal Rules.18 
All of the original Rules were not equally efficacious, and some of the 
fundamental tenets suffered erosion. For instance, during the 1950s, liberal 
pleading prompted certain judges in the Ninth Circuit to seek the revision of 
Rule 8(a)(2), while Charles Clark resisted a similar movement of judges in the 
Southern District of New York.19 The simple but open-ended discovery system 
led to several complications, such as expansive discovery requests, especially 
in complex litigation. 20 
C. The Federal Rules Since the Mid-1970s 
By the 1970s, a number of developments had fostered increasing dissatis-
faction with the Federal Rules. Numerous members of the bench, some law-
yers, and a few commentators suggested that there was a litigation explosion in 
the federal courts.21 These critics asserted that attorneys and parties were pur-
15. See Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. LJ. 241, 
242 (1953). 
16. Charles Clark, the Committee's Reporter and a member of the Second Circuit, was responsible 
for some of the Rules' perceived initial success. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d 
Cir. 1944) (Clark, J.) (interpreting pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)); Charles E. Clark, Special 
Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49-50 (1957) (defending the Rules); see also Clark, supra 
note 15; Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958); 
Tobias, supra note 3, at 277-78. 
17. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 439-40, 445-46 (pleading); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 397 (1982) (discovery). But cf. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(!), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1967) 
(arguing that Rules 19, 23, and 24 were read inflexibly). 
18. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Unifonnity, Divergence 
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2016-19 (1989). Many states based their 
procedures on the federal counterparts. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Sub-
stantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2237 (1989); John B. 
Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil 
Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367, 1377-78 (1986); see also Subrin, supra note 6, at 1650. However, 
numerous states that had long used code procedure did not adopt the federal scheme or borrowed from it 
only minimally. Oakley & Coon, supra, at 1377-78. 
19. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 445 & n.71; Subrin, supra note 3, at 983 & n.433. 
20. See, e.g., New Dyckman Theater Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 206 
(S.D.N. Y. 1954) (noting that the complaint could become "an almost bottomless sea of interrogatories, 
depositions, and pre-trial proceedings on collateral issues that have little relationship to the true issue in 
the case"); see also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 
480 (1958) (contemporaneous account of the erosion of the Rules' principles, particularly concerning 
discovery); Subrin, supra note 3, at 982-84 (subsequent account). 
21. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 
Keynote Address before the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), reprinted in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON Jus-
TICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter POUND CONFER-
ENCE]; Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, Address 
before the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
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suing an excessive number of civil lawsuits, too many of which lacked merit.22 
Several Supreme Court Justices articulated concern about abuse of the litigation 
process, particularly in discovery, and urged circuit and district court judges to 
impose sanctions on lawyers and litigants who participated in such abuse.23 
1. The rise of managerial judging. 
Many judges, especially in the densely populated Northern District of Illi-
nois and Central District of California, began addressing these problems on an 
ad hoc basis, and this practice was denominated "managerial judging."24 
Judges developed an impressive array of procedures which enabled them to 
participate more closely in their civil cases. The judges employed pretrial con-
ferences to monitor the pace of litigation, to formulate and resolve issues in 
dispute, and to promote settlement, particularly by encouraging the use of cer-
tain alternatives to traditional dispute resolution (ADR).25 Some courts re-
stricted the scope and speed of discovery, and a small number levied sanctions 
for discovery abuse or abuse of the litigation process.26 Quite a few judges 
created innovations, including mini-trials and mandatory summary jury trials, 
especially for resolving complex suits.27 The Manual for Complex Litigation 
(MCL) concomitantly provided diverse procedures for treating specific kinds of 
complicated actions, such as mass tort, securities, and takeover litigation.28 
The 1983 Federal Rules amendments and the 1985 promulgation of the second 
edition of the MCL in essence codified procedures which judges had employed 
under the rubric of managerial judging.29 
Justice (Apr. 9, 1976), in POUND CONFERENCE, supra, at 209-14; see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 287-
89 (discussing the debate over the litigation explosion). 
22. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979) (noting that "[d]istrict courts 
must be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settlements"); Arthur R. 
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. l, 2-12 (1984). 
23. See, e.g., Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998-1000 (1980) 
(Powell, J., dissenting); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975). 
24. See STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS (1977); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 647, 660-82 (1988) (responding to Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976)). 
25. See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424, 435-37 (1986); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a 
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770 
(1981); Resnik, supra note 17, at 391-93, 397-99. 
26. See Peckham, supra note 25, at 772, 774; Resnik, supra note 17, at 391-93. 
27. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & JoHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983) (describing experimental local rules for mandatory 
nonbinding arbitration of certain classes of civil actions); Frank E. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Process-
ing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976). 
28. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION (5th ed. 1982). An editorial board of federal judges 
compiled the manual, which affords guidance to district judges for resolving complex cases. See MAN-
UAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION SECOND v (1985); see also note 32 infra and accompanying text. See 
generally Alan J. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?, 
62 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 473 (1988). 
29. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095 (1983); MANuAL FOR 
COMPLEX LmGATION SECOND (1985). 
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Most of these attempts to manage federal civil litigation compromised 
somewhat the tenets of uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity. Con-
sider, for example, the 1983 revisions to Rules 11 (governing sanctions), 16 
(governing pretrial conferences), and 26 (governing discovery). Each of the 
changes reduced simplicity by increasing the number of steps in a case and by 
imposing a larger number of, and more burdensome, duties on lawyers, such as 
compulsory participation in pretrial and discovery conferences.30 Amended 
Rule 16 decreased uniformity and trans-substantivity by recommending that 
judges adjust procedures to particular cases and fashion their own prototypical 
scheduling orders for different classes of lawsuits.31 The second edition of the 
MCL, for its part, limited uniformity and trans-substantivity: The manual ad-
monished judges to handle most complicated actions differently from simpler 
litigation and to tailor specific measures to particular categories of complicated 
cases.32 Nearly all of these attempts to treat complex litigation undermined the 
idea of a uniform national procedural code. 
2. The proliferation of local procedures. 
Another important source of increasing dissatisfaction with federal civil 
procedure has been the growth of local procedures, a phenomenon which has 
accelerated in the last quarter century. Judges often pursued managerial judg-
ing, especially prior to the 1983 Federal Rules amendments, by issuing local 
procedures.33 These local procedures often conflicted with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the United States Code, or the procedures of other federal 
district courts. The Northern District of California's "complex rule" was an 
excellent example: It mandated that counsel participate in preliminary meet-
ings in addition to the pretrial conference and prepare joint pretrial statements 
involving matters such as disputed factual issues and settlement-negotiation 
efforts.34 
30. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 1650; Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments 
to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RurGERS L. REv. 933, 933-52 (1991). See generally ARmUR R. MILLER, 
THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO 11iE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE 
CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER R.EsroNsmILITY (1984). Rule ll's amendment has been criticized 
because it was based on minimal empirical data regarding the problems that it purported to address and 
the revision's efficacy in doing so. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transfonnation of American Civil 
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Laurens Walker, A 
Comprehensive Refonnfor Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1993). 
31. FED. R. C1v. P. 16; see Subrin, supra note 6, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 30, at 937. For one 
account of how the district courts' case-management authority increased under revised Rule 16, see In re 
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988). 
32. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION SECOND 6 (1985); see Subrin, supra note 6, at 1650; To-
bias, supra note 3, at 292 n.148. Ad hoc tailoring deprives the Federal Rules of their efficacy as a 
uniform model for states while jeopardizing intrastate and interstate procedural uniformity. See Subrin, 
supra note 6, at 1650. 
33. Peckham, supra note 25, at 773-89; Resnik, supra note 17, at 399. 
34. See N.D. CAL. R. 235-7, reprinted in Peckham, supra note 25, at 776 n.30; see also Peckham, 
supra note 25, at 776-77. No Federal Rule, particularly Rule 16, which was most directly applicable, 
required lawyers to participate in these activities. Compulsory requirements, therefore, conflicted with 
the Federal Rules. 
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The judiciary itself recognized the complications that local procedural 
proliferation was creating and responded in several ways. The Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, supported 
the adoption of a 1985 revision of Federal Rule 83, which expressly required 
that local rules be promulgated after affording public notice and opportunity for 
comment and that the standing orders of individual judges be consistent with 
the Federal Rules and all local rules. 35 The advisory committee note which 
accompanied the amendment expressed the hope that every district would insti-
tute processes for issuing and reviewing these standing orders.36 The note con-
comitantly implored circuit judicial councils to review all local rules, ascertain 
their validity, determine whether the provisions conflict with the Federal Rules, 
and to discern if the local rules foster interdistrict uniformity and efficiency.37 
The Conference also responded by commissioning the Local Rules Pro-
ject,38 which was to collect and organize all local rules, standing orders of 
individual judges, and other local requirements.39 The Conference additionally 
instructed the Project to evaluate problems that the proliferation of local proce-
dures had created and to recommend ways of resolving those problems.40 In 
1989, the Project published its findings41 : The ninety-four federal district 
courts had issued approximately 5000 local rules, many of which conflicted 
among themselves and with the Federal Rules.42 The most widely prescribed 
local rules covered pretrial procedures, particularly pretrial conferences and 
discovery. Most districts imposed presumptive numerical restrictions on inter-
rogatories, while numerous courts established case-tracking systems for rou-
tine, simple suits. 43 There was also considerable variation among the districts. 
For example, the Middle District of Georgia had promulgated one local rule 
and eleven standing orders, while the Central District of California adopted 
thirty-one local rules with 434 subrules and 275 standing orders.44 Local rules 
35. FED. R. C1v. P. 83. The 1985 amendment, which bore little relationship to the 1983 revisions, 
resulted from the normal federal amendment process and addressed concerns about the "soundness [of 
the local] process as well as the validity of some rules." Id. advisory committee's note (1985 
amendments). 
36. Id. advisory committee's note. 
37. Id. 
38. See CoMMilTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JuDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIIE U.S., 
REPORT OF TIIE LocAL RULES PROJECT: LocAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 1 (1989) [hereinafter REl'oRT 
OF THE LocAL RULES PROJECT]; see also Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers & Stephen N. Subrin, 
The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (1989) (providing background on the Local Rules Project). 
39. See Coquillette et al., supra note 38, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, Project 
Director, Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992). 
40. See Coquillette et al., supra note 38, at 63; Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra 
note 39. 
41. See REPORT OF THE LocAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 38, accompanying mem. 
42. Id. at 1; see Subrin, supra note 18, at 2020-26; see also Coquillette et al., supra note 38, at 62. 
43. Coquillette et al., supra note 38, at 65; see also U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR nm DISTRICT OF 
WYOMING, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (1991) [hereinafter WYOMING 
PLAN] (describing an inconsistent local procedure); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT 
OF NEW YORK, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PLAN] (same); Subrin, supra note 18, at 2024-26 (discussing similar 
inconsistencies). 
44. See REPORT OF nm LocAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 38, at l; see also Coquillette et al., 
supra note 38, at 62. 
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are only one form of local procedures which have eroded uniformity and sim-
plicity. The Local Rules Project discovered that a number of other procedures, 
variously named general orders, standing orders, special orders, scheduling or-
ders, or minute orders, cover local procedural practice in the ninety-four dis-
tricts.45 Numerous judges have also applied a host of procedures which have 
not been reduced to writing.46 
The Judicial Conference responded to the Local Rules Project's report by 
requesting that the federal districts conform all of their local procedures to the 
Federal Rules. The Conference provided additional valuable recommendations, 
suggesting, for instance, that local rules be numbered in a manner consistent 
with the Federal Rules.47 The suggestions have not yet been fully imple-
mented, however. 48 
The federal judiciary, in attempting to respond to the challenges of modern 
litigation, deviated substantially from the tenets that had motivated the Rules' 
drafters, often modifying or even reversing earlier efforts. 49 Some alterations 
may have been attempts to make the Rules function as originally intended or to 
correct mistakes in the Rules by implementing suggestions that the Advisory 
Committee rejected in 1938.50 Still other changes were apparently efforts to 
fill gaps in the original Rules or represent new understandings.51 But the most 
45. Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 39; Telephone Interview with Stephen 
N. Subrin, Consultant to the Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992). 
46. For example, a few districts experimented with the coequal assignment of civil cases to Article 
ill judges and magistrate judges. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDucnoN PLAN 3-4 (1991) [hereinafter MONTANA PLAN]. See gener-
ally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MoNT. L. REv. 91 (1992). Other courts 
required that litigants make good faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes before filing motions and to 
certify those efforts in writing. See, e.g., WYOMING PLAN, supra note 43, at 13; see also Letter from 
Avern Cohn, Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, to Carl Tobias (Jan. 13, 
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cohn Letter] (referring to judicial discretion and unwritten local 
practices). 
47. Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 39; Telephone Interview with Stephen 
N. Subrin, supra note 45. 
48. Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 39; Telephone Interview with Stephen 
N. Subrin, supra note 45. Indeed, the Advisory Committee recently proposed an amendment to Rule 83 
that would require consistent numbering. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Con-
ference of the U.S., Proposed Rules: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, 150 F.R.D. 323, 400-401 (1993) (hereinafter 1993 Proposed 
Amendments). 
49. See generally Subrin, supra note 6, at 1648-51. For example, Rules 11, 16, and 26 replace 
attorney self-regulation with judicial control, while Rule 26 significantly restricts open-ended discovery. 
Local procedural proliferation has eroded interfederal district court uniformity, and suggestions in the 
Manual for Complex litigation Second and Rule 16 thatjudges develop several prototypical scheduling 
orders for different types of cases have limited intercase uniformity. See note 31 supra and accompany-
ing text. Similarly, the rise of managerial judging and its codification in Rule 16 exemplify efforts to 
tailor procedures to particular cases, thereby undermining the trans-substantivity of the initial Federal 
Rules. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
50. For example, Rule 16 could be an effort to have pretrial conferences restrict the scope of cases 
or expose frivolous cases. FED. R. C1v. P. 16. The specific provision regarding issue formulation insti-
tutes a concept like one suggested by Judge Clark in 1935 but rejected by the Committee. See Subrin, 
supra note 3, at 978-79. 
51. Rule 16's reference to settlement includes a topic not mentioned in the original Rules and 
evinces new appreciation of settlement's significance. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 496, 527 & n.144. 
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important modifications, the phenomenon of managerial judging and the 1983 
amendments, may constitute recognition that the uniform, simple, liberal, flexi-
ble scheme embodied in the 1938 Rules was itself partly responsible for the 
perceived litigation explosion and litigation abuse. 
3. Emerging concerns about procedural revision processes. 
Numerous observers have voiced concerns about the processes for changing 
the procedures that govern federal civil litigation, particularly the Federal 
Rules. In 1973, Congress intervened in national rule revision by passing legis-
lation that replaced the Federal Rules of Evidence that the Supreme Court had 
promulgated in 1972, thus preempting years of effort by Judicial Conference 
committees.52 During 1974, Congress postponed the effective date of the re-
vised Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for one year.53 In the 1980s, Con-
gress again intervened in the rule revision process by rewriting an amendment 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, governing service of process, which the 
Supreme Court had transmitted.54 Finally, in 1977, Congress began holding 
the hearings that led to the passage of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1988.55 
52. See H.R. REP. No. 889, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29 (1988); see also Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (1988 & Supp. 
IV 1992)). The Rules Enabling Act provides that rules amendments which the Supreme Court transmits 
by May 1 will become effective on December 1 unless Congress acts to change the amendments. 28 
U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992); see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 335-38 (discussing the 
relationship between the judicial and legislative roles in enforcing and promulgating rules of procedure). 
This was an important compromise struck in gaining passage of the Rules Enabling Act, which autho-
rizes court rulemaking. 
53. Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (1974); see Howard Lesnick, The 
Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 579 (1975). Congress 
thereafter often intervened to "delay the effective date of, disapprove, or modify rules and amendments." 
H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 52, at 27. 
54. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 
2527 (1983) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988)); see also Paul D. Carrington, Continuing 
Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 733, 733 (1988) (discussing prospects 
for reform in Rule 4). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal 
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 844-46 (1991) (analyzing the nascent 
proposal to amend Rule 4 and the rulemaking process); Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the 
Theory and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4( c), 73 VA. L. REv. 1183 (1987). For 
criticism of the national rule revision process, see Burbank, supra note 30, at 1925-27; Harold S. Lewis, 
Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15( c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. 
REv. 1507, 1559-62 (1987) (questioning the ability of the judicial process to clarify Federal Rules); 
Walker, supra note 30, at 457. 
55. See H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 52, at 23. 
During this period, a number of commentators expressed their views on what authorities should be 
involved in the rule revision process, what their respective roles should be, and on how the process 
should be conducted. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT Rui.E-MAKINo PROCE-
DURES (1977); Lesnick, supra note 53; Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Proce-
dures, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 905 (1976); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE LJ. 
1284, 1287-94 (1978) (reviewing REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES). In 1979, the Judi-
cial Conference itself convened a conference on federal rulemaking and in 1981 issued a comprehensive 
report. See WINIFRED R. BROWN, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIIE U.S., FEDERAL RULEMAKING: 
PROBLEMS AND PossIB!LITIES (1981). The report thoroughly canvassed the existing revision process, 
criticisms and proposals for changes in the structure of rule revision committees, the content of rules, 
and Congress' reviewing role. 
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II. CONGRESS TAKES ACTION: THE 1988 JumcIAL IMPROVEMENTS Acr AND 
THE 1990 CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
A. Introduction 
The sponsors of the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
(JIA) intended to modernize, regularize, and open the national and local proce-
dural amendment processes. The proponents of the JIA apparently wanted to 
restore the primacy of national rule revision and to limit the proliferation of 
local procedures. Congress may also have meant the legislation to reinvigorate 
numerous procedural tenets, such as uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substan-
tivity, which animated the drafters of the original Federal Rules in 1938. 
The CJRA, however, had very different purposes. Its supporters were 
mainly concerned about litigation costs and delay. Congress seemingly failed 
to coordinate this legislation with the JIA. Before several of the 1988 Act's 
important aspects could be thoroughly implemented, and prior to the release of 
the report of the Federal Courts Study Committee commissioned by the 1988 
legislation,56 Senator Joseph Biden introduced the bill that became the CJRA.57 
That law eventually preempted important reforms envisioned in the 1988 Act. 
B. The 1988 Act 
1. National rule revision. 
Congress intended that the 1988 Act modernize court rule revision. Specif-
ically, this statute sought to systematize and open the national and local proce-
dural rulemaking processes and concomitantly to curb the proliferation of local 
rules. These features of the legislation were apparently designed to revitalize 
the 1938 tenets, but the CJRA of 1990 essentially suspended certain of those 
aspects.58 
The JIA prescribed reform of the processes for revising national and local 
procedures. At the national level, the legislation was supposed to improve the 
quality of rule revision by opening the amendment process to enhanced public 
scrutiny and participation.59 The statute in essence assimilated Federal Rules 
amendment to notice-comment rulemaking for federal administrative agencies 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.60 The JIA provided for enhanced 
56. The JIA prescribed the establishment of the Federal Courts Study Committee and requested 
that it undertake a comprehensive study of the federal courts and issue a report with recommendations 
for improvement in 1990. Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 101, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 
(1988); see REPORT OF TiiE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE (1990). 
57. S. 2648, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
58. Other important directives of the JIA encouraged experimentation with court-annexed arbitra-
tion. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 651-658 (1988). See generally BARBARA s. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED 
ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990). 
59. See H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 52, at 27; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1988). See 
generally Mullenix, supra note 54, at 830-32. 
60. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988) with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1988). Notice-com-
ment rulemaking is informal rulemaking whereby an agency proposes a rule, seeks public comment on 
that proposal, considers that input, and decides whether to issue a final rule. See Walker, supra note 30, 
at 468-69. 
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public involvement commencing with the earliest phases of rule revision.61 
Congress also left intact certain aspects of the national rule revision process. 
All of the entities-the Congress, the Court, the Judicial Conference, the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Com-
mittee), and the Advisory Committee-which had historically participated in 
the amendment process would continue to do so.62 
2. Local procedural revision. 
More significant to the issues treated in this article, Congress intended that 
the 1988 legislation ameliorate complications that local procedural proliferation 
had created. The House Judiciary Committee Report observed that the Com-
mittee had "found a proliferation of local rules, many of which conflict with 
national rules of general applicability."63 Congress attempted to treat local pro-
cedural proliferation primarily by imposing requirements for amending local 
rules that were analogous to those governing the amendment of the Federal 
Rules. 64 The statute mandated that every federal district appoint a local rules 
committee to work with all of the judges in the court to formulate local rules, 
and the legislation imposed on each district a public notice and comment re-
quirement whenever it adopts new, or changes existing, local rules. 65 Congress 
apparently intended that these commands also govern the procedures which 
individual judges apply.66 Congress made the revision process exclusive, 
thereby seeking to insure that districts and judges would not circumvent the 
requirements by ascribing a different name to local procedures, such as "stand-
ing" or "minute" orders. 67 
Congress as well sought to restrict local procedural proliferation by impos-
ing on circuit judicial councils an affirmative obligation to review periodically 
61. The measure increased public access to information that is relevant to amendments and re-
quired that meetings of certain rule revision entities, particularly the Advisory Committee, be opened to 
the public after notice is afforded. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). The Act also required that any entity 
which makes a suggestion for procedural change "shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on 
the rule, and a written report explaining the body's action, including any minority or other separate 
views." Id. § 2073(d). Moreover, the legislation afforded Congress several additional months to review 
amendments which the Supreme Court forwards, and this was an apparent attempt to enhance that 
review's effectiveness. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also H.R. REP. No. 889, 
supra note 52, at 27-28. 
62. Congress correspondingly decided to retain the existing composition of the rule revision insti-
tutions, although it did consider possible changes to the Advisory Committee's constitution. The propo-
sal would have required that advisory committees consist of "a balanced cross section of the bench and 
bar, and trial and appellate judges." Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Un-
founded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 
U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2076 n.50 (1989); see also notes 232-233 infra and accompanying text. 
63. H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 52, at 27. The Report also stated that the Judicial Conference 
had addressed the "problem of proliferating local rules" and commended the Local Rules Project for its 
"valuable work." Id. at 28. 
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 note (1988). 
65. Id.; cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 83 (imposing a similar notice and comment requirement). As with the 
national rule revision entities, Congress did not prescribe committee composition. See Carrington, supra 
note 62, at 2076 & n.50. 
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 note (1988). 
67. Id. § 2071(f). 
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all local procedures for consistency with the Federal Rules. The legislation 
authorized the councils to "modify or abrogate [all] procedures found inconsis-
tent."68 Congress thus imposed a continuing duty on the councils to scrutinize 
the local procedures that existed when the legislation became effective on De-
cember 1, 1988, and all procedures subsequently adopted.69 
C. The 1990 Act 
1. Background. 
Although only two years elapsed between the time when Congress passed 
the 1988 and 1990 statutes, the measures had very different origins, proponents, 
and concerns. In contrast to the decade-long gestation period which preceded 
enactment of the 1988 statute, the 1990 CJRA passed within a year of its intro-
duction. Senator Biden's Senate Judiciary Committee was the source of the 
1990 Act, which emphasized problems resulting from litigation abuse.70 
Concerned about increasing cost and delay in civil litigation, Senator Biden, 
the Brookings Institution, and the Foundation for Change organized a task force 
to study the civil justice system and develop recommendations for improve-
ment.71 The task force found considerable dissatisfaction among judges, law-
yers and litigants with the federal civil justice system. The task force 
determined that mounting cost and delay in civil litigation threatened court ac-
cess for many individuals and groups,72 and it recommended that federal courts 
implement reforms primarily relating to judicial case management, discovery, 
and ADR.73 
In early 1990, Senator Biden introduced a bill which substantially embod-
ied the task force's recommendations.74 It proved to be very controversial. 
Many federal judges opposed the bill, principally because it mandated that all 
ninety-four federal districts adopt numerous procedures to reduce expense and 
delay.75 The judges believed the bill represented an effort by Congress to 
micromanage the federal courts, bypassed the normal rule revision process, and 
potentially jeopardized those procedures and the work of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee that Congress itself had commissioned. Some judges also 
68. Id. § 332(d)(4) note; see also id. § 2071(c)(l). 
69. Id. § 332(d)(4); see also id. § 2071 note. 
70. For comprehensive treatment of the background to the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act, see 
Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Refonn: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 
833, 837-80 (1994). For more limited and specific treatment, see Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The 
Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Summer 1991, at 105; Lauren Robel, 
Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994). 
71. This discussion draws substantially on TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING CoSTS AND DELAY IN C1v1L LmGATION (1989) [hereinafter 
BROOKINGS REroRT]; see also SENATE CoMM. ON THE Ju01c1ARY, S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d 
Sess. 13-14 (1990). 
72. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 71, at 5-6. 
73. Id. at 12-29. 
74. S. 2648, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
75. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 71, at 4-6, 30-31; see also Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of 
Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON D1sP. REsoL. 115, 128-29 (1991) (detailing several 
related reasons why judges opposed the CJRA). 
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voiced concern that there was insufficient consultation with the judiciary before 
the legislation's introduction.76 The Judicial Conference ultimately developed 
a "Fourteen-Point Plan" in response to Senator Biden's bill.77 Following hear-
ings and negotiations with the Judicial Conference, Congress passed a revised 
version of the bill in November 1990.78 
The CJRA was then and continues to be controversial. Some observers 
dispute whether the federal courts have actually experienced serious delay in 
civil dispute resolution. Indeed, a comprehensive study published in 1990 
found that there was considerably less delay, particularly in the sense of time to 
disposition, than many contended.79 Some critics have observed that, insofar 
as delay exists, it may vary significantly across the ninety-four districts.so 
Others argue that delay is a relative concept. 81 For example, it might be inap-
propriate to characterize as delay warranting remediation the extra time poorly 
financed litigants need to develop the factual information necessary to prove 
their cases. 82 Additional critics believe that the CJRA is unresponsive to im-
portant sources of expense and delay, such as the criminal justice system, or 
that the legislation was motivated too greatly by political special interests.83 
2. The CJRA's provisions. 
The CJRA required all federal districts to create civil justice expense and 
delay reduction plans by December 1993.84 The purposes of the plans were "to 
facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, 
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive reso-
76. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 71, at 4-6, 10, 30-31. 
77. Id. at 30-31; see also Robel, supra note 75, at 128 (detailing the Judicial Conference's pre-
emptive proposals). 
78. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-106, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089-98 
(1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. Iv 1992)); see also S. REP. No. 416, supra 
note 71, at 3-6. 
79. See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL EcoN-
OMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990); see also TERENCE DUNWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, 
RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LmGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990) 
(arguing that there is no evidence to support the contention of increased time to disposition). 
80. See, e.g., Avem Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Couns, LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1991, at 99, 101. For a discussion of comparative delay in district courts, 
see Robel, supra note 75, at 117-23. 
81. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 70, at 849-51; Robel, supra note 75, at 117-23; see also 
DUNWORTH & PACE, supra note 79. 
82. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1423; see also Robel, supra note 75, at 121-22 (challenging the 
relationship between delay reduction and increased access to justice). 
83. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 80, at 100-03 (arguing that the CJRA is unresponsive to the crimi-
nal justice system and politically motivated); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Proce-
dural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375, 400-01 (1992) (same); Carl Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil 
Justice Refonn, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 857, 857 & n.1 (1993) (suggesting that the CJRA is politically 
motivated); see also David A. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel 
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 123 (1983) (questioning whether 
litigation expenses are excessive). 
84. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. IV 1992) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5089-90 (1990)). 
July 1994] IMPROVING THE ACTS 1603 
lutions of civil disputes."85 The districts were to adopt the plans after examin-
ing reports and recommendations submitted by advisory groups. 86 
The advisory groups, appointed by the district courts ninety days after the 
CJRA's passage, were to be balanced and to include lawyers and other individ-
uals representative of civil litigants.87 The Act instructed every group to ana-
lyze the "state of the court's civil and criminal dockets," "identify trends in 
case filings and in the demands being placed on the court's resources," and to 
designate the "principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation" in the dis-
trict. 88 The legislation also required that each group's recommendations con-
sider the particular needs and circumstances of the district, its litigants, and 
their counsel while guaranteeing that all of them contribute significantly to "re-
ducing cost and delay and thereby facilitating access to the courts."89 
Once the advisory groups completed their reports and recommendations, 
the district courts were to evaluate the recommendations and consider adopting 
the eleven suggested principles, guidelines, and techniques of civil justice re-
form delineated in the Act and any other procedures which they believed appro-
priate to decrease delay and expense.90 Section 473(a) prescribes six principles 
and guidelines for managing litigation and reducing cost and delay. They are: 
creation of a system for tailoring case management to meet the unique circum-
stances of each case, early judicial involvement to establish timelines, discov-
ery conferences, voluntary and cooperative discovery, strict limits on discovery 
motions, and increased use of ADR.91 Those district courts which issued plans 
before December 31, 1991, were designated early implementation district 
courts (EIDCs). The deadline for the remaining districts to publish plans was 
December 1993.92 
The Act also required the Judicial Conference to designate ten districts, 
including five which encompassed metropolitan areas, as pilot districts.93 By 
December 31, 1991, these districts were to adopt plans which included the six 
principles and guidelines of litigation management and expense and delay re-
duction in section 473(a).94 Moreover, Congress mandated an independent 
study of the pilot program and that the Judicial Conference make recommenda-
tions regarding the principles and guidelines by December 31, 1995.95 
The statute correspondingly instituted a demonstration program, whereby 
the Western District of Michigan and the Northern District of Ohio would ex-
periment with differentiated case management and the Northern District of Cal-
85. Id. § 471. 
86. Id. § 472. 
87. Id. § 478(b). 
88. Id. § 472(c)(l). 
89. Id. § 472(c)(2)-(3). 
90. Id. § 472(a), 473(a)-(b). 
91. Id. § 473(a)(l)-(6) see also id. § 473(b)(l)-(5) (describing five less important techniques). 
92. Id. § 471 note (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 5089, 5096 (1990), as 
amended by Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 505, 106 Stat. 4506, 
4513 (1992)). 
93. Id. § 471 note (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 105, 104 Stat. at 5097-98 (1990)). 
94. Id.; see id. § 473(a)(l)-(6). 
95. Id. § 471 note (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 105, 104 Stat. at 5097-98 (1990)). 
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ifornia, the Western District of Missouri, and the Northern District of West 
Virginia would experiment with various methods of expense and delay reduc-
tion, including ADR.96 The Act requires that the Judicial Conference analyze 
and report on this program to Congress by December 31, 1995.97 
The legislation also created entities to monitor implementation of the plans. 
First, the statute requires circuit review committees, comprised of the chief cir-
cuit judge and chief district judges within each circuit, to review all plans and 
reports and to make recommendations for actions deemed appropriate for de-
creasing expense and delay in civil cases.98 Second, the Act commands that 
the Judicial Conference review all plans and reports and authorizes it to request 
additional action when necessary.99 
Finally, the statute requires the districts to perform annual assessments. 
When preparing these assessments, the district courts must consult with their 
advisory groups in evaluating the condition of the courts' dockets and in at-
tempting to develop additional methods for decreasing expense and delay.Ioo 
In short, the legislation's proponents hoped that this method of generating 
reform strategies "from the bottom up" would foster innovation while improv-
ing communication and promoting consensus among the users of the federal 
court system within and across districts. IOI 
m. ANALYSIS OF THE Acrs' IMPLEMENTATION 
In enacting the 1988 Act, Congress accurately perceived that local proce-
dural proliferation had eroded uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity 
and framed a response to this specific problem. The CJRA effectively sup-
planted those dimensions of the 1988 statute which aimed at curbing the 
proliferation of local rules. Congress' concern about increasing expense and 
delay in civil litigation led it to impose requirements in the 1990 legislation 
which in essence suspended efforts to limit proliferation initiated under the 
1988 Act. In this Part, I first analyze the 1988 Act's implementation, empha-
sizing how its procedural requirements respecting national rule revision af-
fected the development and substance of the 1993 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. I then assess the implementation of the CJRA, focus-
ing on federal districts' promulgation of civil justice plans, and I conclude by 
evaluating the sources of conflict between the two Acts. 
A. The JIA's Implementation 
1. Local rule revision. 
Most of the ninety-four federal district courts have appointed local rules 
committees to advise them on procedural changes. However, a number of dis-
96. Id. § 471 note (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 104, 104 Stat. at 5097 (1990)). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. § 474(a). 
99. Id. § 474(b). 
100. Id. § 475. 
101. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 71, at 4. 
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tricts have only recently formed such committees, and some courts have yet to 
do so.102 Numerous districts have formalized their processes for adopting and 
revising local procedures while opening them to public input. Some districts 
have actually promulgated new, or amended existing, local procedures under 
these processes. Many local rules committees, however, have participated min-
imally in civil justice reform.103 
Although most districts have formalized and opened their processes for pre-
scribing and changing procedures as required by the 1988 Act, very few have 
implemented that legislation's requirements regarding local procedural prolifer-
ation. For example, only a tiny number of courts have attempted to limit the 
number of local procedures, much less reviewed the procedures promulgated 
by individual judges or modified local procedures found inconsistent with local 
rules, the Federal Rules, or the United States Code.104 The Seventh Circuit 
Judicial Council is apparently the only one that has scrutinized its districts' 
local procedures and changed or abrogated those which it deemed 
inconsistent.105 
A number of factors explain the limited implementation of the 1988 Act's 
requirements. Most importantly, the CJRA effectively suspended the commit-
tees' and councils' work when it assigned overlapping procedural revision tasks 
to federal districts and to the nonnational entities, advisory groups, and circuit 
review committees created under the Act.106 For example, local rules commit-
tees had few incentives to propose and adopt local rules when advisory groups 
and districts were formulating new, potentially inconsistent local procedures. 
The committees and councils had no greater motivation to review and alter or 
102. For example, the Eastern and Western Districts of North Carolina had not appointed commit-
tees at the time they issued plans. See U.S. DISTRICT CouRT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH 
CAROLINA, C1v1L JusncE EXPENSE AND DELAY REoucnoN PLAN 5 (1993); Letter from Sam Hamrick, 
CJRA Analyst, United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, to Carl Tobias 
(Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with author). Very few individual judges have created such entities. Telephone 
Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 39. Moreover, the 1988 Act imposed no requirements 
relating to the composition of the committees, so that some of them may not be balanced with respect to 
plaintiff and defense perspectives, political viewpoints, large and small firm interests, geography, race, 
or gender. See note 65 supra. 
103. This assertion is premised on conversations with numerous individuals who are familiar with 
reform efforts in the federal districts; see also Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 39. 
A few districts attempted to involve their committees in reform efforts or included committee members 
in their advisory groups. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE 
DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, REPoRT AND RECOMMENDED PLAN Ill (1992); see also Carl Tobias, 
Civil Justice Refonn in the Founh Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 89, 108 (1993). Most of the 
districts, however, eclipsed or suspended the committees' work. 
104. Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 45. Indeed, few districts apparently 
have implemented similar aspects of the 1985 amendment of Federal Rule 83. See notes 35-37 supra 
and accompanying text. 
105. Telephone Interview with David Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive for Legal Affairs, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (July 22, 1994); Telephone Interview with Mary P. 
Squiers, supra note 39. 
106. See notes 86-89, 98-99 supra and accompanying texts; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the Judicial Council 4-5 (May 4, 1994) (on file with the Stanford Law 
Review) (voting to suspend further review of local rules until the Council received further guidance from 
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law on whether the CJRA authorized adoption of local rules 
that conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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eliminate any such procedures found to conflict when the 1990 CJRA appar-
ently authorized inconsistency. 
Another, less significant reason for the 1988 legislation's comparatively 
limited implementation is the inherent tension between local priorities and the 
goal of national procedural uniformity. Federal district judges and local rules 
committees comprised of local practitioners were probably less concerned 
about maintaining national uniformity than about accommodating the needs of 
local federal judges, attorneys, and parties.107 In fairness, the judges, local 
rules committees, and circuit judicial councils that attempted to review local 
procedures for inconsistency with federal requirements may have encountered 
problems defining exactly what is a conflict, particularly between those proce-
dures and the Federal Rules. 108 
2. National rule revision. 
In evaluating the national rule revision process that the 1988 Act instituted, 
this Part will examine the proceedings that led to the promulgation of the 1993 
revisions to the Federal Rules. These proceedings were unusual in three signif-
icant respects. First, this was the first important test of the new requirements. 
Second, the package of amendments that emerged from the process was one of 
the most ambitious sets of revisions ever developed. 109 Third, the perceived 
need to accommodate the civil justice reform requirements of the 1990 Act 
rendered the rule revision process atypical, if not sui generis. Notwithstanding 
these peculiarities, it is important to assess the process that yielded the 1993 
amendments because evaluation affords valuable insights into modem national 
rulemaking and into the tensions between the 1988 and 1990 Acts. 
Although the Advisory Committee implemented the 1988 statute by ini-
tially proposing amendments in eighteen Federal Rules during 1991,110 I shall 
focus on the revisions that it proposed in Rule 11, which governs sanctions for 
filing papers without sufficient prefiling inquiry, and Rule 26, which requires 
automatic disclosure of discoverable materials. The Advisory Committee had 
primary responsibility for developing these two amendments, which were the 
most controversial changes proposed. Studying the revision process enhances 
understanding of several tenets that are critical to modem civil litigation, of 
107. I am merely saying that most local rules committees will be more sensitive to, and favorably 
disposed toward, the needs of local lawyers, litigants, and judges than is the Advisory Committee. See 
generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & Sec'y REv. 95 (1974). For example, a few districts exclude counsel admitted to 
practice elsewhere because of disparities in local bar admission requirements. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 
U.S. 641, 643-44 (1987); see also Coquillette et al., supra note 38, at 64. 
108. Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, supra note 39; Telephone Interview with Stephen 
N. Subrin, supra note 45; see also Coquillette et al., supra note 38, at 64. 
109. It may also be premature to analyze the efficacy of the amendments which have been in 
effect for less than a year. 
110. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Pro-
posed Rules: Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]; see also Randall 
Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited: Committee Debates Funher Amendments, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 
1992, at l. 
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how those tenets can conflict, and of tensions that arose in effectuating the two 
Acts. 
I focus on Rule 11 because its 1983 revision was highly controversial, pri-
marily due to the amendment's adverse effects on court access, and represented 
a failed attempt to treat perceived abuses of the litigation process apparently 
made possible by the liberal, flexible procedural system of the 1938 Rules.m 
The Rule, therefore, typifies tensions between several important procedural ten-
ets. Moreover, the proceeding that led to Rule 11 's 1993 amendment exempli-
fies the type of open revision process that Congress seemingly contemplated 
when it enacted the JIA. 
I stress Rule 26's provision for automatic disclosure because of the wide-
spread concern that numerous problems with discovery, such as its abuse, will 
ultimately jeopardize civil litigation 112 and because the automatic disclosure 
amendment generated more controversy than any formal change proposed pre-
viously. Rule 26's 1993 revision also illustrates how compliance with the 1988 
statute's requirements governing national procedural amendment and congres-
sional failure to integrate the two Acts' implementation exacerbated local pro-
cedural proliferation, further eroded national uniformity and simplicity, and 
increased expense and delay. I first provide a brief, general outline of the na-
tional revision process.113 
General description of the rule revision process. The national rule revision 
entities, especially those primarily responsible for developing proposals for 
procedural change, seemed to implement effectively and faithfully the 1988 
Act's requirements governing the amendment process. The revision process 
they implemented was modeled substantially on notice and comment adminis-
trative rulemaking. , 
In August 1991, the Advisory Committee published a preliminary draft of 
proposed changes to eighteen Federal Rules. 114 The Committee then solicited 
and received extensive public comment on the proposals in writing and at two 
public hearings. 115 It was generally responsive to that public input and made 
good faith efforts to improve the proposals, particularly those that were the 
most controversial. Indeed, the Committee inverted the normal sequence with 
111. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 low A 
L. REv. 1775, 1775 (1992); Walker, supra note 30, at 455-59. 
112. See, e.g., Committee on Discovery, New York State Bar Association Section on Commercial 
and Federal Litigation, Report on Discovery Under Rule 26(b)(l), 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990); Maurice 
Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 
B.Y.U. L. REv. 579; Ralph K. Winter, Jn Defense of Discovery Refonn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263 (1992). 
But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse 
and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1994) (arguing that there is 
no hard evidence of frequent discovery abuse). 
113. In my treatment of amended Rules 11 and 26, I rely substantially on Carl Tobias, The Trans-
mittal Letter Translated, 45 FLA. L. REv. - (forthcoming 1994). 
114. Preliminary Draft, supra note 110. 
115. See William J. Hughes. Reflections from the House: Congressional Reaction to the 1993 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 1-2 (1993); Tobias, 
supra note Ill, at 1778; see also Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule II, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 862-63 
(1992). 
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Rule 11 by seeking public comment before drafting its proposed amendment to 
the Rule.116 
The remaining rule revision entities, including the Supreme Court, deferred 
to the Committee by making only one major change in its Rule 11 proposal and 
very few other modifications.117 Congress scrutinized the 1993 amendments, 
and although the House of Representatives opposed Rule 26's automatic disclo-
sure provision, Congress allowed the entire package to become effective.118 
The process in action: amending Rule 11. The process that led to Rule 11 's 
1993 amendment was replete with ironies.119 In 1983, the rule revision entities 
substantially amended Rule 11, primarily by encouraging judges to impose 
sanctions as a method for curtailing litigation abuse. A mere eight years 
later, 120 the courts faced new problems, namely satellite litigation and chilling 
effects, which the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 had created.121 Nonetheless, the 
proceeding which culminated in the 1993 revision of Rule 11 illustrates the 
considerable potential of the formal, open process Congress envisioned in 
1988. 
Virtually all parties whose interests would have been affected by Rule 11 's 
amendment were dissatisfied with the Advisory Committee's preliminary draft, 
which was, for instance, relatively unresponsive to the problems of satellite 
litigation and chilling effects. One suggested change would have imposed a 
continuing duty to withdraw even small segments of papers when they lost 
merit, and another authorized large monetary sanctions for contravening the 
Rule. These provisions would have discouraged vigorous pursuit of litigation 
by parties with limited resources.122 The proposal also expressly included de-
nials, in addition to allegations, as components of papers which must comply 
with the Rule, and limited recovery of attorney's fees for Rule violations. 
Those requirements especially troubled defense counsel. 123 Many attorneys 
116. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Call for 
Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 
335, 344-45 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Written Comments]. 
117. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 501-13 (1993) 
(White, J., separate statement; Scalia, J., dissenting statement) (indicating that the Supreme Court con-
tinued its historic practice of deferring to the expertise of these entities and apparently deferred more 
substantially than ever). For a discussion of the change made in Rule 11, see notes 126-127, 133-137 
infra and accompanying texts. 
ll8. The package became effective on December l, 1993, when Congress failed to act See note 
52 supra; see also Hughes, supra note 115, at 2 n.5. 
ll9. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra note ll5; Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 
1992 Wis. L. REv. 236 (letter to the editors). 
120. This time frame for testing a revision's efficacy was substantially shorter than the generation 
suggested by knowledgeable experts, including two former Advisory Committee Reporters. See Marvin 
E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 52 (1968) (para-
phrasing Professor Benjamin Kaplan); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: 
Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 677 (1979); see also Arthur R. 
Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 505-06 (1990). 
121. See Tobias, supra note ll9, at 236; see also Tobias, supra note ll5, at 862-65. See gener-
ally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475 
(1991). 
122. See Tobias, supra note ll9, at 237. See generally Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 485, 495-98 (1988-1989); Vairo, supra note 121, at 484-86. 
123. See Tobias, supra note ll9, at 237. See generally Vairo, supra note 121, at 495-500. 
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and litigants were bothered by the considerable ambiguity in the proposed 
Rule's wording.124 Numerous observers criticized the proposal despite the Ad-
visory Committee's comprehensive analysis of the 1983 revision; its solicita-
tion of, and attentiveness to, public input; and its careful efforts to draft changes 
that would be responsive to the needs of all participants in federal civil 
litigation.125 
The Advisory Committee responded to the criticism with several new 
drafts. These modifications reflected the Committee's conscientious considera-
tion of much written public input and oral testimony at the public hearings and 
its commitment to drafting the most equitable, clear, effective amendment pos-
sible.126 Indeed, the Committee's efforts to develop the final proposal consti-
tute the kind of open, responsive amendment process and rational 
decisionmaking that Congress contemplated when it altered the rule revision 
procedures in the 1988 Act.127 
Despite the Committee's herculean endeavors, some observers remained 
opposed to the 1993 amendment.128 The most prominent critic was Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who wrote a stinging dissent to the Supreme Court's transmittal 
of the revised Rule. 129 The dissent argued that the amended Rule 11 would 
"eliminate a significant and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation."130 Jus-
tice Scalia also asserted that the change would render the Rule toothless by 
affording judges discretion to impose sanctions, disfavoring reimbursement for 
litigation expenses, and by prescribing safe harbors that would enable litigants 
who violate the provision to escape sanctions completely.131 Even in the face 
of such criticism, the rule revision entities, whose membership was then com-
posed almost exclusively of federal judges, apparently determined that the po-
tential detriments of a more stringent revision, such as fostering more satellite 
litigation and discouraging valid claims, outweighed its advantages, such as 
deterring frivolous litigation.132 
124. See Tobias, supra note 119, at 238; see also Tobias, supra note 115, at 894-95; Vairo, supra 
note 121, at 497-98. 
125. See Call for Written Comments, supra note 116, at 345; see also Tobias, supra note 115, at 
861-65. Dissatisfaction with the Committee's preliminary draft led several federal judges and other 
distinguished members of the American legal establishment to develop their own proposal for revising 
Rule 11. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Patrick Higginbotham, Mary M. Schroeder, George C. 
Cochran, Francis Fox, John P. Frank, Hugh Jones, Laura Kaster, Jerold S. Solovy & Bill Wagner, 
Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159 (1991). This counterproposal 
recommended that the Committee omit the provisions creating a continuing duty to withdraw papers that 
lose merit and authorizing attorney fee awards as sanctions. Id. at 165-66. The plaintiffs', public inter-
est, and civil rights bars, among others, considered the bench-bar proposal much more acceptable. 
126. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 lNo. L.J. - (forthcoming 1994); 
see also Tobias, supra note 115, at 859-65. 
127. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra. See generally Walker, supra note 30. 
128. The following discussion draws on Tobias, supra note 126 (manuscript at 26-29, text accom-
panying notes 112-128). 
129. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507-10 (1993) (dissenting 
statement of Scalia, J.). 
130. Id. at 507. 
131. Id. at 507-08. 
132. See Tobias, supra note 126 (manuscript at 14 & n.57); see also notes 232-233 infra and 
accompanying text 
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This support of federal judges for the Rule 11 revision seemed to figure 
prominently in congressional receptivity to the amended Rule transmitted by 
the Court. Most senators and representatives apparently concluded that it 
would be very difficult to improve on numerous aspects of the revision ten-
dered.133 The changes constituted the well-considered opinion of the rule 
amendment entities and their expert advisers or represented the most effective 
ways of treating the enormous spectrum of factual circumstances Rule 11 
covers.134 
The revision process was responsive to the problems with the 1983 amend-
ment and to the public input, yielding a balanced amendment to Rule 11. On 
the one hand, the rule revision entities may have substantially diminished the 
incentives for employing amended Rule 11 by creating safe harbors and author-
izing judges to exercise discretion in deciding to impose sanctions.135 On the 
other hand, the revisors retained some incentives for pursuing sanctions, such 
as the possibility of recovering attorneys' fees. 136 The rule revision entities 
also relied on ambiguous language, such as "nonfrivolous" and "appropriate 
sanctions," that may foster inconsistent enforcement and satellite litigation.137 
Nevertheless, the 1993 version significantly improved its predecessor and 
was considerably clearer and fairer than the Advisory Committee's preliminary 
draft. The amended provision should reduce incentives to invoke Rule 11 im-
properly and concomitantly decrease expense and delay attributable to satellite 
litigation. Moreover, the 1993 Rule is a well-considered, workable compro-
mise, given rule revision's serious restraints, such as satisfying the diverse con-
stituencies that Rule 11 affects. 
One of the best explanations for the outcome of the 1993 amendment of 
Rule 11 is that numerous judges seemingly determined that the Rule had at-
tained all that could reasonably be achieved by encouraging lawyers and parties 
to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries and by discouraging their filing of 
meritless papers. The revisors may correspondingly have decided that the ben-
efits of applying the Rule zealously could not justify spending limited resources 
133. For example, the chair of the House subcommittee reponsible for reviewing Rules amend-
ments, Representative William Hughes, deferred to the federal judiciary because he found much support 
for the amendment and for restricting the satellite litigation that the 1983 Rule 11 engendered. See 
Federal Courts: Bill to Delete Discovery Rule Reported to House, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 
150, at A-150 (Aug. 6, 1993) (reporting that despite his "reservations," Representative Hughes would 
"defer to the judiciary's conclusions with regard to [Rule 11]"). Other senators and representatives 
were less deferential and introduced bills which would have postponed the revision's effective date for a 
year. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2979, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
134. For example, the revised Rule relied on words, such as "reasonable" and "likely," that may 
be the clearest, fairest way of addressing the intrinsically fact-specific questions raised by sanctions 
motions. See Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 420-23 (text of amended Rule 11(a)-(b) as transmitted by the 
Supreme Court); see also Tobias, supra note ll 1, at 1791. For a general analysis of the difficulty of 
drafting and implementing precise administrative rules, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). 
135. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 410, 421-23 (1993); see 
also Tobias, supra note ll1, at 1783-88. 
136. See Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra note ll1, at 1787-88; note 
134 supra and accompanying text. 
137. See Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 420-23. 
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of judges, counsel, and litigants, for example, on satellite litigation that the 
Rule promotes. Probably critical also were the perceptions among judges, law-
yers, and litigants that discovery is currently the most pressing problem in civil 
litigation and that it needed more reform and held greater promise for actual 
improvement than Rule 11. 
The process in action: amending Rule 26. The process of revising Federal 
Rule 26 to provide for automatic disclosure was equally ironic, but for different 
reasons. 138 The Advisory Committee apparently forgot its unfortunate experi-
ence with the 1983 amendment of Rule 11.139 Despite the lack of empirical 
data confirming widespread discovery abuse and limited experimentation with 
automatic disclosure, 140 the Advisory Committee issued a preliminary draft in 
1991 prescribing automatic disclosure.141 The proposal would have required 
that plaintiffs and defendants disclose before discovery material that was likely 
to bear "significantly on any claim or defense."142 The Committee proposed 
this relatively untested, potentially far-reaching new procedure, even though 
the CJRA's enactment evinced congressional concern that experimentation pre-
cede significant modification of discovery.143 Nearly all of the approximately 
twenty EIDCs created under the CJRA that chose to require automatic disclo-
sure relied substantially on the language in the Committee's preliminary 
draft. 144 
138. This discussion draws from Griffin B. Bell, Chilton Davis Varner & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, 
Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REv. l (1993); Carl Tobias, Colli-
sion Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993); Tobias, supra note 113; Winter, supra 
note 112. 
139. Although it lacked empirical information on how the original (1938) Rule 11 functioned, the 
Committee substantially modified that initial version in 1983; the revision ultimately became the most 
controversial change in the Rules' half-century history. See note 111 supra and accompanying text; see 
also Burbank, supra note 30, at 1927-28 (suggesting that little empirical data existed on the 1938 ver-
sion's operation). 
140. See Mullenix, supra note ll2; Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on 
John Setear's The Barrister and The Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REv. 649 (1990). Only three federal districts had 
experimented with automatic disclosure. See Bell et al., supra note 138, at 17-18; Mullenix, supra note 
54, at 813-21. Moreover, two of disclosure's first proponents had earlier suggested promulgating a 
national rule only after considerable testing. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil 
Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 V AND. L. REv. 1295, 1361 (1978) (acknowledging 
the need for experimentation before applying disclosure requirements nationally); William W 
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 
723 (1989) (suggesting that reform might come about through the implementation of the disclosure 
proposal and stating that a trial period might help demonstrate the benefits of such reform). Judge 
Schwarzer, the FJC Director, and Magistrate Judge Brazil, an Advisory Committee member, also fig-
ured prominently in the disclosure draft's development. 
141. See Preliminary Draft, supra note llO, at 88. 
142. Id. at 87-88. 
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. IV 1992). See generally Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experi-
mentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REv. 665, 667-68 (1993); Tobias, supra note 2. 
144. The lack of available disclosure models probably led the districts to rely substantially on the 
language included in the Committee's preliminary draft. Compare MONTANA PLAN, supra note 46, at 
15-16 and EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YoRK PLAN, supra note 43, at 4-5 with Preliminary Draft, supra 
note llO, at 87. 
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No formal recommendation to revise the Federal Rules has prompted such a 
barrage of opposition from so many diverse users of the federal courts.14s Dur-
ing an extensive comment period and in public hearings, most segments of the 
organized bar and numerous other interests criticized the draft because it was 
unclear, might add another layer of discovery, raised ethical dilemmas, and 
would increase expense.146 
At the conclusion of the public hearing on the 1991 package of proposals 
which was held in Atlanta during February 1992, the Advisory Committee re-
sponded by deleting automatic disclosure from its set of preliminary drafts, 
seemingly deferring the provision pending the results of experimentation with 
disclosure that was proceeding in a number of districts. 147 For a brief moment, 
the Committee apparently believed that selective local experimentation was 
preferable to the nationwide application of the controversial and comparatively 
untested technique.148 
A short six weeks later, the Advisory Committee again changed its position, 
without more public comment or explanation. Second Circuit judge Ralph K. 
Winter, a strong advocate of automatic disclosure,149 spearheaded the issue's 
reexamination.1so During an April 1992 meeting, the Committee revived its 
proposal to require that parties disclose the names of all individuals who are 
likely to have "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with 
particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information," as 
well as "all documents, data compilations and tangible things" that have such 
relevance.1s1 In an apparent attempt to accommodate efforts proceeding under 
the CJRA, the provision permitted districts to vary the Federal requirements or 
to reject them completely.1s2 
Justice Scalia, in dissenting from transmittal of the disclosure amendment, 
stated that the Advisory Committee may have considered the CJRA's experi-
mentation schedule too protracted, "preferring instead to subject the entire fed-
eral judicial system at once to an extreme, costly, and_ essentially untested 
revision of a major component of civil litigation."1s3 The Committee defended 
its decision to reverse course twice on the grounds that discovery was not func-
tioning effectively, that retention of the status quo was unacceptable, and that 
145. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 410, 512 (1993) (dissent-
ing statement of Scalia, J.); Bell et al., supra note 138, at 28-32; Ann Pelham, Forcing Litigants to 
Share: Judges Back Radical Discovery Rule, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, at l. 
146. See Bell et al., supra note 138, at 28-32; Tobias, supra note 138, at 141. 
147. See Bell et al., supra note 138, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 112, at 268; Sambom, supra 
note 110, at 12. That experimentation is to continue for at least three years, and the Judicial Conference 
is to evaluate it and report to Congress by late 1995. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. IV 1992). 
148. See Bell et al., supra note 138, at 34-35; Sambom, supra note 110, at 12. 
149. See Winter, supra note 112. 
150. See Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 6; 
Sambom, supra note 110, at 12. 
151. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 410, 431 (1993). 
152. See id. at431-432; see also Bell et al., supra note 138, at 35-39. But see Winter, supra note 
112, at 269 (arguing that the revised proposal responded to the legitimate concerns of critics). 
153. Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 512 (dissenting statement of Scalia, J.). 
July 1994] IMPROVING THE ACTS 1613 
the bar's self-interest obstructed meaningful change.154 The Committee appar-
ently comprehended that withdrawal of the disclosure amendment would have 
effectively delayed judicially required discovery reform for most of the 1990s 
because of the 3-year rule revision process that the 1988 Act imposed.155 Cer-
tain observers even portrayed the Committee's reversal as an act of desperation 
to slow the erosion of the judiciary' s procedural influence by congressional 
legislation and executive branch initiatives, such as Executive Order 12,778.156 
The remaining rule revision entities approved the Committee draft in the 
face of continuing opposition, particularly from the bar. The Supreme Court 
transmitted unchanged the disclosure amendment, even though three Justices 
dissented.157 After the Court tendered the revisions, practically all elements of 
the bar and many additional interests, ranging across the political spectrum 
from civil rights plaintiffs to corporations, attempted to persuade Congress to 
delete the disclosure provision. 
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees held hearings on the disclo-
sure provision and the remaining amendments during the summer of 1993.158 
Representative William Hughes, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Judicial Administration and Intellectual Property, proposed legislation omitting 
disclosure, which the House enacted by voice vote on November 3.159 The 
Senate unexpectedly failed to pass the bill before adjourning, primarily because 
civil rights groups, plaintiffs' lawyers, and defense attorneys and interests were 
unable to reach a satisfactory compromise on disclosure, Rule 11, and pre-
sumptive limits on discovery.160 
The Senate's failure to pass the legislation engendered considerable confu-
sion, complexity, and consternation in the federal district courts, especially 
those fifty courts that were rushing to meet the December 1 deadline by which 
the CJRA required them to issue civil justice plans and on which the federal 
154. See Pelham, supra note 150; Samborn, supra note 110, at 12; see also Bell et al., supra note 
138, at 35-39. The last observation illuminates another irony. Virtually all segments of the organized 
bar seemed both to oppose the disclosure proposal and to agree that many problems accompany modern 
discovery. For example, Judge Winter astutely observed during the April meeting that lawyers will 
resist discovery reform so Jong as they bill by the hour. See Pelham, supra note 150; Samborn, supra 
note 110, at 12; see also Winter, supra note 112, at 271, 277. 
155. If the Committee had withdrawn or if Congress had omitted the automatic disclosure amend-
ment, the rule revisors would have had to recommence the 3-year rule revision process. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2074(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (prescribing rule revision process). 
156. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. IV 
1992). See generally Tobias, supra note 2 (describing congressional reforms); Carl Tobias, Executive 
Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1521 (1993) (describing executive initiatives). 
157. Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 507 (Scalia, Thomas & Souter, JJ., dissenting). 
158. See Hughes, supra note 115, at 3-4, 9-11. 
159. See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 139 CoNG. REc. H8746-47 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 
1993); Randall Samborn, Bill to Stop Change Dies: New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 
6, 1993, at 3, 40. 
160. See Samborn, supra note 159, at 40; see also Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L 
LJ., May 24, 1993, at l, 33; notes 177-179 infra and accompanying text. For example, civil rights 
groups would not compromise on revised Rule 11, while the plaintiffs' bar refused to uncouple disclo-
sure and presumptive limits. 
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disclosure requirements took effect.161 Because most of the districts had ex-
pected Congress to omit the disclosure requirement, numerous courts appar-
ently undertook little planning for other contingencies and had to make 
eleventh-hour decisions regarding the new requirements. Threats to revive the 
legislation, which continued well into 1994, exacerbated the uncertainty.162 
The districts and numerous EIDCs, many of which had implemented forms 
of disclosure that differed from the new federal revision, 163 responded vari-
ously. Most courts published or amended civil justice plans, issued general and 
special orders, promulgated new local rules, or revised existing ones, even in-
voking the emergency clause of the Rules Enabling Act. 164 A number of the 
non-EIDCs "opted out," rejecting completely the new federal amendment, 
adopted provisions that differed from the federal requirements, or suspended 
the federal revision pending additional study.165 Numerous EIDCs retained di-
verse forms of automatic disclosure which are dissimilar to the federal require-
ments or continued eschewing disclosure altogether. 166 In the final analysis, a 
majority of the districts will apparently decide against applying the federal 
amendment.167 
The developments described above created much confusion in most of the 
federal districts. Conflicting procedures complicated federal civil litigation for 
lawyers and litigants, especially for government and public interest attorneys 
who litigate in multiple districts, and it tested judges' and practitioners' toler-
ance for inconsistency. Many lawyers and litigants experienced difficulty find-
ing the relevant procedures, ascertaining which ones actually applied and when 
they became effective, and complying with the new requirements. Indeed, the 
CJRA Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York urged that the rule 
revisors observe a 3-year moratorium on the affected national rules during 
which time districts could assess the reforms' local effects.168 By the summer 
of 1994, however, numerous districts had implemented and publicized courses 
161. See Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure: Let It Be, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, at 25; see also 
Samborn, supra note 159, at 40. For statutory deadlines, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 2074 (Supp. IV 1992). 
162. See Tobias, supra note 161, at 25. These observations are based on telephone conversations 
with many people who are familiar with the legislative process and with civil justice reform. 
163. See note 144 supra and accompanying text; see also DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1994). 
164. E.g., S.D. IND. R. 26.3 (invoking the emergency clause); D. Mo. R. 104.1; see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 207l(e} (Supp. IV 1992) (emergency clause). 
165. See, e.g., D. Me. R. 18(g); E.D. LA. R. 606E (amended Dec. 1, 1993); see also STIENSTRA, 
supra note 163; John Flynn Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, Is "Source of Confusion": Crit-
ics, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17. 
166. See, e.g., D. MoNT. ORDER (Jan. 25, 1994); N.D. GA. ORDER (Feb. 26, 1994). 
167. See SnENSTRA, supra note 163; see also Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L 
L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5; Rooney, supra note 165. 
168. See Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York, to Joseph F. Spaniel, Jr., Secretary, Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 1, 1992); see also Stephen 
B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Callfora Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. Rev. 841, 
856 (1993) (advocating an evaluation of the course and process by which civil justice reform is occur-
ring and a moratorium on reform until evaluation is concluded). 
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of action to treat automatic disclosure procedures, ameliorating somewhat the 
difficulties for judges, lawyers, and litigants.169 
The above examination of automatic disclosure's implementation indicates 
that it undermined uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity while increas-
ing judicial discretion and expense and delay.17° The new procedure's actual 
application in many particular cases apparently has had similar effects. More 
specifically, the imprecise character of what must be disclosed and the imposi-
tion of an additional layer of discovery has often increased expense and perhaps 
delay. 
It may be too early to know for certain whether any of the diverse automatic 
disclosure procedures will prove effective. 171 Only a tiny number of districts 
that have required disclosure for the greatest period have implemented require-
ments similar to those of the new federal amendment, and they have not experi-
mented with the procedure for enough time to evaluate its effectiveness 
conclusively.172 Early anecdotal evidence does suggest that some courts, both 
EIDCs and non-EIDCs, have experienced little difficulty applying the device, 
especially in relatively simple cases or when the disclosure is very general.173 
Automatic disclosure has essentially required lawyers and litigants to perform 
certain tasks, particularly document retrieval and labeling, earlier in the litiga-
tion process.174 The consequent earlier exchange of important information 
could effect savings in time and money that would have been devoted to formal 
discovery and may foster prompter settlement. 
In short, the debate over disclosure cannot be definitively resolved at pres-
ent. Disclosure's implementation certainly tested the tolerance for inconsis-
tency and uncertainty of judges, lawyers, and litigants while eroding uniformity 
and simplicity and increasing expense and delay. These factors may ultimately 
prove to be short-term or fixed costs of adopting a new procedure, particularly 
if widespread experimentation in specific districts leads to the discovery of a 
169. These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals familiar with the cir-
cumstances in numerous districts and with the actions that a number of districts instituted. 
170. The assertions in this paragraph are premised on conversations with numerous individuals 
familiar with disclosure and civil justice reform; see also text accompanying notes 177-179 infra (assert-
ing that provision in specific cases for judicial modification or litigant stipulation erodes uniformity and 
simplicity and increases cost and delay). 
171. See, e.g., CJRA ADVISORY GROUP OF THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ANNuAL RE-
PORT 5-8 (1994) (valuable assessment reflecting ambivalence about disclosure's efficacy); see also AD-
VISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, ANNUAL 
REPORT 6-8 (1993); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, REPORT ON THE 
IMPACT OF THE COST AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 13-17 (1993). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. 
IV 1992) (requiring periodic district court assessment). 
172. Most of the EIDCs only instituted disclosure during 1992, and few have rigorously evaluated 
its efficacy. See Tobias, supra note 138, at 144-45. 
173. These include the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona, Massachusetts, 
and Montana. This evidence is derived from conversations with numerous individuals who are familiar 
with civil justice reform in those districts; see also Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Reform in 
Montana, 54 MoNT. L. Rev. 357, 363 (1993). Unfortunately, discovery is the most problematic and 
requires the most efficacious disclosure in complex lawsuits, such as products liability litigation. See 
Bell et al., supra note 138, at 39-42; Winter, supra note 112, at 268. 
174. These ideas are premised on the conversations mentioned in note 173 supra. 
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highly efficacious disclosure mechanism with which courts, counsel, and liti-
gants are comfortable. 
Other relevant procedures. The Advisory Committee's August 1991 pre-
liminary draft included several additional proposed changes which warrant 
brief examination because they implicate the issues considered in this article. 
The rule revision entities deleted some of these proposals during the amend-
ment process, while others took effect on December 1, 1993. 
Perhaps the most important of the omitted proposals was an amendment in 
Rule 83 that would have authorized local procedural experimentation. Districts 
securing Judicial Conference approval could have experimented for not more 
than five years with local rules which contravened the Federal Rules.175 This 
approach carefully balanced the need for experimentation to develop effica-
cious procedures with the problems that proliferating inconsistent local rules 
can create. Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee withdrew the proposal, in 
apparent deference to ongoing experimentation under the CJRA.176 
The 1993 amendments imposing presumptive numerical limitations on in-
terrogatories and depositions are also important to the questions addressed in 
this article.177 These prescriptions, by providing for local variation and for 
judges and litigants to modify the requirements in specific cases, resemble the 
federal automatic disclosure revision.178 For example, the provisions gov-
erning presumptive limits have led some districts to opt out of or to vary the 
national requirements, thus eroding uniformity and simplicity and increasing 
expense and delay .179 Certain amended provisions of Rule 16 covering pretrial 
conferences and scheduling orders, which authorize local adoption and modifi-
cation of time restraints in various situations, including the time for disclosure 
under Rule 26, may have similarly decreased uniformity, simplicity, and trans-
substantivity and enhanced costs. 180 Another significant revision was the 1993 
175. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 110, at 153 (proposed Rule 83(b)). 
176. Compare id. with COMMITIEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE tbl. of contents 
(1992) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENoMEITTS] (showing the deletion of proposed amendment to Rule 
83). The Judicial Conference also deleted a proposal to amend Rule 56 which proved controversial, 
particularly in light of widespread belief that a 1986 trilogy of Supreme Court cases had appropriately 
modified the availability of summary judgment. Compare Preliminary Draft, supra note llO, at 141 
with Memorandum from L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 
to the Chief Justice of the United States and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court (Nov. 27, 
1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 514, 514 (1993) (showing the deletion of the proposed amendment to 
Rule 56). See generally Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment 
After Celotex, 40 HAsT!NGS L.J. 53 (1988); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolu-
tion: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. 
L. REv. 35 (1988). 
177. See FED. R. Civ. P. 29, 30(a)(2)(A), 33(a). 
178. Presumptive limits are structured similarly to automatic disclosure, and they raise several 
analogous issues. The most important issue involves provision in specific cases for judicial modifica-
tion and litigant stipulation, provisions which were not considered above to avoid additionally compli-
cating already complex treatment. See notes 138-174 supra and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., D. MoNT. ORDER (Jan. 25, 1994); N.D.N.Y. GEN. ORDER (Dec. 14, 1993). 
180. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 427-28 (1993) (text 
of amended Rule 16(b) as transmitted by the Supreme Court); see also id. at 478-79 (demonstrating that 
the 1993 amendment to Rule 54(d)(2)(B) and (D) similarly prescribed local options); D. Mo. R. 104.1; 
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amendment of Federal Rule 4, 181 which judges, lawyers, and litigants had ex-
perienced difficulty employing since Congress changed the provision in 
1983.182 
In sum, the 1988 Act's requirements governing local procedural revision 
received limited implementation because the 1990 CJRA essentially suspended 
effectuation. Implementation of the JIA' s strictures covering national proce-
dural amendment, as witnessed in the 1993 revision of Federal Rule 11, illus-
trates the type of amendment process that Congress apparently envisioned in 
enacting the 1988 legislation and highlights the tensions between several signif-
icant tenets. Effectuation of the JIA, as manifested in the provision for auto-
matic disclosure, shows how that statute's requirements, and Congress' failure 
to harmonize them with those of the CJRA, worsened local procedural prolifer-
ation, further undermined national uniformity and simplicity, and increased ex-
pense and delay. 
B. The CJRA's Implementation 
In this Part, I first evaluate the institutions responsible for implementing 
and monitoring the 1990 Act. I then explore how the CJRA, especially its 
requirement of nationwide experimentation, its internal inconsistencies, and its 
implicit invitation to the districts to promulgate procedures inconsistent with 
the Federal Rules and the United States Code, ultimately eroded uniformity and 
simplicity and increased expense and delay. I next identify some beneficial 
effects of the statute's implementation. Throughout the analysis, I emphasize 
the experience of EIDCs because these courts have been experimenting since 
1991, and their efforts have received some evaluation. The remaining districts 
have only recently adopted civil justice plans, and most of these courts have 
prescribed procedures identical or similar to those selected by the EIDCs.183 
1. The implementing entities. 
Congress intended that the CJRA bring together local, diverse interests that 
would develop expense and delay reduction plans which were responsive to all 
participants in federal civil litigation. Unfortunately, under the statute, Con-
gress chose instrumentalities and assigned them duties that eventually under-
mined uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity and increased expense and 
delay principally by exacerbating local procedural proliferation. 
One reason for these complications was the lack of balance in the composi-
tion of the advisory groups that the districts were to consult before promulgat-
S.D. INo. R. 26.3. See generally note 31 supra and accompanying text (describing the provision in Rule 
16's 1983 amendment prescribing differential case treatment). 
181. Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 405. 
182. See id. at 558 (text of amended Rule 4 advisory committee's note as transmitted by the 
Supreme Court); see also text accompanying note 54 supra. 
183. The procedures that the EIDCs prescribed have received relatively little evaluation for effi-
cacy. I examined some of the procedures above. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text; note 58 
supra and accompanying text (ADR); notes 170-174 supra and accompanying text (automatic disclo-
sure); notes 177-179 supra and accompanying text (presumptive limits on discovery). 
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ing their plans. For instance, a number of the groups included too many 
defense counsel or too few individuals with limited resources. 184 Another 
source was the inherently local perspective of the participants. The legislative 
mandate that each group consider the district's particular circumstances in com-
piling its recommendations probably led the groups to formulate proposals 
which exhibited greater concern for the needs of local judges, practitioners, and 
litigants than for preserving national uniformity and simplicity and which were 
quite different.185 
2. The monitoring entities. 
Congress designated several bodies to monitor the Act's implementation 
and gave the instrumentalities rather general and unclear duties, sharply reduc-
ing their potential to respond meaningfully to the local disuniformity and com-
plexity promoted by the CJRA.186 For example, most circuit review 
committees did not closely evaluate, much less recommend changes in, 
plans.187 Another factor contributing to less rigorous oversight was the reluc-
tance of chief district judges to review critically the procedures adopted by 
other district judges in their circuits, with whose courts they may have been 
unfamiliar.188 The Judicial Conference discharged its monitoring duties with 
184. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE SOUTIIERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA, REPORT OF TIIE 
C1VIL JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP i (1991) (list of advisory group members includes more defense coun-
sel than other types of lawyers); ADVISORY GROUP FOR TIIE U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE DISTRICT OF 
MONTANA, REPORT OF TIIE C1vIL JuSTicE REFORM ACT OF 1990 frontispiece (1991) (few resource-poor 
litigants); U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR TIIE DISTRICT OF WYOMING, ADVISORY GROUP REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDED PLAN frontispiece (1991) (primarily defense counsel and "defendants"). See generally Ga-
lanter, supra note 107, at 97-119 (discussing how certain defendants and defense counsel, as "repeat 
players" in litigation, can secure strategic advantages). 
185. For example, the Eastern Districts of Arkansas and Virginia issued terse plans that changed 
virtually no local procedures. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991). 
The Eastern District of Texas compiled an equally short plan which included a few novel, provoca-
tive measures, while the Massachusetts District adopted a lengthy plan containing numerous complex 
procedures. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, C1v1L JuSTicE EXPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991) [hereinafter EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PLAN]; U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT FOR TIIE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991). 
This analysis may appear crudely instrumental. I am only saying that the advisory groups are less 
expert and less concerned about maintaining national uniformity and simplicity than, for example, the 
Advisory Committee. For instance, a few groups suggested that their courts more strictly enforce local 
procedures. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT & BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR TIIE DISTRICT OF IDAHO, EXPENSE AND 
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN I (1991) [hereinafter IDAHO PLAN]; U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR TIIE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JuSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3 (1991) [hereinafter 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PLAN]. 
186. The entities are circuit review committees, the Judicial Conference, and Congress. See 28 
U.S.C. § 474 (Supp. IV 1992). The Case Management Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on Case Management and Court Administration technically has initial responsibility for Confer-
ence review. 
187. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1407-09. 
188. Id. at 1407-08. Even in those few circuits which conducted rigorous reviews, the federal 
districts did not always implement the committees' suggestions for change. For example, the Montana 
District did not implement the Ninth Circuit Review Committee's suggestions regarding local proce-
dures. See NINTII CIRCUIT REVIEW COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT PLANS (1992); 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 1408. 
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no greater rigor for analogous reasons relating to the responsible Conference 
Committee's composition and its equally unclear, weaker, statutorily assigned 
responsibilities. 189 
3. The structure of experimentation. 
Congress wrote the 1990 Act, and the courts have effectuated the legisla-
tion, in ways that have eroded uniformity and simplicity while increasing judi-
cial discretion, cost, and delay. One important problem was Congress' decision 
to require that all ninety-four districts implement civil justice reform, creating 
an environment in which many courts were experimenting simultaneously. 
This limited the opportunities for courts to build on prior experience and to 
benefit from interdistrict consultation.190 
Congress correspondingly mandated that every district consider eleven stat-
utorily enumerated procedures, 19 1 rather than prescribing a narrower program, 
for instance, by restricting experimentation to fewer districts or by limiting the 
number of new procedures that courts could apply. Such provision has allowed 
districts to implement a confusing array of local procedures, 192 which ulti-
mately complicate and increase the cost of litigation. 
4. Legislative guidance in the CJRA's initial three sections. 
Unclear and sometimes conflicting instructions in the Act's first three sec-
tions have eroded uniformity and simplicity and have increased expense and 
delay.193 Specific provisions even include internal inconsistencies. For exam-
ple, Section 472 requires that advisory groups make suggestions which will 
both "reduc[e] cost and delay" and "facilitat[e] access to the courts."194 But 
these two goals may in many cases be incompatible, as the litigation exper-
iences of numerous impecunious parties demonstrate. Resource-poor litigants 
often require greater time to complete discovery and assemble sufficient infor-
mation to prove their cases; consequently, measures that seek to expedite litiga-
tion may actually diminish these parties' access to the courts.195 
189. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1409-11; see also id. at 1411-13 (analyzing congressional reluc-
tance to perform rigorous oversight). 
190. Congress required that all districts appoint advisory groups within 90 days after the Act's 
passage. 28 U.S.C. § 478(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Thirty-four courts did qualify for EIDC status by adopt-
ing plans by December 31, 1991. Nonetheless, most districts fully implemented those plans in 1992 and 
only issued their first annual assessments in 1993, while a number of non-EIDCs attempted to complete 
their plans by the end of 1992. Therefore, numerous groups and courts were effectively laboring at the 
same time, and relatively few districts capitalized on prior experimentation or interdistrict cooperation. 
191. See id. § 473(a), (b) (prescribing the principles, guidelines, and techniques). 
192. See text accompanying note 185 supra; see also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic 
Ills Afflicting Courts be Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 721 (1993) (discussing 
similar problems with experimentation's structure). 
193. Section 471 states the purposes of civil justice plans; section 472 informs advisory groups 
how to assemble reports and recommendations; and section 473 lists principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques which districts must consider and may adopt. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-473 (Supp IV 1992). 
194. ld. § 472(c)(3). 
195. See Tobias, supra note 122, at 495-98; see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 1422-25. 
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More important to this article, the statute implicitly invites the courts to 
promulgate procedures that conflict with other directives in the Federal Rules 
and the United States Code.196 Nothing in the Act or its legislative history 
seems to prohibit these conflicts. Section 473 states that districts must con-
sider, and may adopt, eleven listed procedures, and a number of districts appar-
ently relied on the prescriptions, particularly those governing discovery, to 
implement inconsistent local procedures.197 The statute's twelfth provision, 
which allows districts to adopt such other procedures as they deem proper after 
considering their advisory groups' suggestions, implicitly encourages courts to 
implement measures contravening external requirements.198 The civil justice 
plan for the Eastern District of Texas forcefully asserted local supremacy by 
proclaiming that "[t]o the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 
inconsistent with this Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling."199 The 
court, seemingly attempting to exercise its newly found authority, adopted an 
offer of judgment procedure that apparently conflicts with Federal Rule 68.200 
The district also imposed a maximum fee schedule in contingent fee cases not 
covered by fee-shifting statutes, even though the Supreme Court has expressly 
stated that Congress, not the judiciary, is to allocate litigation expenses.201 
5. Other implementation issues. 
The procedures actually promulgated under the Act. As mentioned above, 
the courts promulgated different permutations of the eleven principles, guide-
lines, and techniques enumerated by the statute, and a number of districts 
adopted additional procedures under the open-ended prescription.202 Many of 
these procedures created problems by eroding uniformity, simplicity, and trans-
substantivity while increasing expense and delay. 
196. The Rules Enabling Act requires that local rules be "consistent with Acts of Congress" and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 207l(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 83 (requiring that local rules be consistent with the Federal Rules). 
197. The most controversial and troubling examples involved automatic or mandatory predis-
covery disclosure procedures, some of which would have substantially transformed traditional discov-
ery. See, e.g., EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PLAN, supra note 43, at 4-5; IDAHO PLAN, supra note 
185, at 10-11. 
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing that in formulating their plans, district 
courts must consider and may include "such other features as [they] consider[ ] appropriate after con-
sidering the recommendations of the advisory group"). Congress may have considered this a narrower 
grant of authority than did a number of judges. Robel, supra note 70, at 1464-72; see also CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGIIT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 438-39 (5th ed. 1994). 
199. EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 185, at 9. 
200. Id. at IO. 
201. EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 185, at 7-8; see Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 834-35 (1990); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 34 
(1991) (stating that fee awards should be based primarily on statutes, and only secondarily on courts' 
supervisory powers). Numerous other districts have adopted procedures that actually are or appear 
inconsistent, but most have been less direct about doing so than the Texas court. See, e.g., note 46 supra 
(analyzing the Montana District Court's experimentation with coequal assignment of civil cases to Arti-
cle m judges and magistrate judges). For elaboration of how the principles, guidelines, and techniques 
in the Act enable districts to erode uniformity and simplicity, see Tobias, supra note 2, at 1418-22. 
202. See text accompanying notes 191-192 supra. 
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Most of the districts adopted some specific procedures that imposed these 
problems. For instance, when districts implemented varied forms of automatic 
disclosure, this sacrificed uniformity and simplicity. Many districts imple-
mented case-management techniques that increased judicial discretion to re-
quire lawyers or litigants to prepare more papers, such as specialized discovery 
plans, and to be involved in more conferences.203 Procedures authorizing the 
referral of cases to ADR enhanced judicial discretion to require that attorneys 
and litigants participate in activities which may impose greater expense and 
delay.204 A number of districts developed multiple tracks tailored to case type 
or complexity which allowed courts to assign different procedures to dissimilar 
civil cases, thereby increasing judicial discretion and decreasing uniformity and 
trans-substantivity.205 Even those procedures that achieved the 1990 statute's 
goal of reducing cost or delay might have done so at the expense of uniformity, 
simplicity, or trans-substantivity or of other important process values, such as 
fairness or court access. 206 
Issues of procedural interpretation and application. Many judges have in-
consistently interpreted the new local procedures, and some have not even ap-
plied certain provisions that their districts prescribed.207 Moreover, lawyers 
and litigants have encountered difficulty finding the applicable procedures.208 
The experience with automatic disclosure illustrates this idea. Some districts 
never reduced to written form their new procedures that govern automatic dis-
closure, leaving resolution to local practices or understandings. Other districts 
circulated letters to local federal court practitioners or issued general or special 
orders, few of which documents are readily accessible to lawyers outside the 
districts.209 These problems are not confined to automatic disclosure's imple-
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l)-(3), (a)(5), (b)(l)-(3), (b)(5) (Supp. IV 1992) (recommending dif-
ferential treatment of cases, enhanced judicial case management and control of the pretrial process, and 
improved discovery procedures). 
204. See id. § 473(a)(6), (b)(4) (recommending referral of cases to ADR). 
205. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, CIVIL JUSTICE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDucnoN PLAN 102-06 (1991); U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DIS-
TRICT OF lu.INOis, C1v1L JUSTICE DELAY AND EXPENSE REDucnoN PLAN 2-4 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 473(a)(l)-(3) (Supp. IV 1992). 
206. See text accompanying note 195 supra. For instance, procedures which expedite dispute 
resolution or which mandate participation in ADR frequently disadvantage resource-poor litigants who 
need more time for discovery and for preparing cases and that may be unable to afford the costs of ADR. 
See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1423; see also Burbank, supra note 13, at 1466-71 (discussing process 
values). 
207. Anecdotal evidence, gleaned from my conversations with numerous individuals familiar with 
ongoing civil justice reform efforts, identifies numerous examples, four of which are comparatively 
clear: the Northern District of California, the Southern District of Indiana, and the Districts of Massa-
chusetts and Montana. See Carl Tobias, Recent Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 55 MONT. L. 
REv. 235, 239 (1994). Some judges in these and other districts simply do not apply all of the civil 
justice reform procedures, while there is interdivisional disuniformity in Montana. 
208. This discussion draws from my review of nationwide developments in civil justice reform, 
gleaned from analyzing advisory group reports and recommendations and districts' plans and from con-
versations with many individuals knowledgeable about civil justice reform. See notes 138-174 supra 
and accompanying text. 
209. See, e.g., Order of John H. Moore II, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida, to Federal Court Practitioners (Nov. 9, 1993); Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief 
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Montana, to the Federal Bar (Jan. 25, 1994). 
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mentation; a number of districts adopted their reforms as part of local practices 
or understandings or in general, special, standing, or scheduling orders, rather 
than in civil justice plans or local rules. 
6. Evaluation of the 1990 CJRA 's implementation. 
Although Congress apparently envisioned that CJRA experimentation 
would receive rather rigorous evaluatjon, difficulties with the Act's implemen-
tation may have compromised that goal's attainment. For example, as men-
tioned before, the essentially simultaneous nature of experimentation 
complicated efforts to assess various procedures by comparing their efficacy 
across districts. Moreover, numerous districts experienced problems compiling 
the annual assessments that the 1990 Act requires.210 A number of EIDCs 
completed their evaluations more than a year after adopting plans. Some courts 
encountered difficulties because they did not create clear baselines for measur-
ing cost and delay reduction.211 Quite a few districts issued terse assessments 
which included little data or other analytical material.212 
Congress required all ninety-four courts to undertake annual assessments 
with a view to refining the efficacy of their procedures.213 Some districts have 
performed well-structured, comprehensive, or informative evaluations,214 while 
a few districts have even improved their procedures in light of information 
which the assessments revealed.215 
Despite the current lack of empiricral data, some themes can be identified. 
As I have suggested above, many aspects of the Act and its implementation-
including the very procedures adopted under the statute-eroded the tenets of 
uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity while increasing cost and delay. 
Moreover, the experimentation described effectively suspended those elements 
of the 1988 legislation that were intended to ameliorate the difficulties created 
by local procedural proliferation.216 
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. IV 1992). 
211. See Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 124 
(1993); see also Mullenix, supra note 83, at 402-05. 
212. See, e.g .. ANNUAL AssESSMENT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING (1993); U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ANNUAL AssESSMENT 
REPORT (1993), available in WESTLAW, CJRA Database. 
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. IV 1992); see also text accompanying note 100 supra. 
214. See, e.g .. U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ANNuAL AssESS· 
MENT OF THE CONDmON OF THE COURT'S DOCKET 1-4 (1993); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF NEW JERSEY, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION Pl.AN 
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 IN THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 1-3 
(1992) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY ASSESSMENT]; U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
Omo, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET 1-3 (1993) [hereinafter NORTHERN DIS-
TRICT OF OHIO ASSESSMENT]. 
215. See, e.g .. NEW JERSEY AssESSMENT, supra note 214, at 20; TEX. GEN. ORDER No. 92-93 
AMENDING ARTICLE FOUR, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct 29, 1992); cf. 
DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN 
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN (1992) (amending the CIRA plan to implement a differentiated case-manage-
ment system). 
216. For elaboration of this point, see note 106 supra and accompanying text. 
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7. Beneficial aspects of the 1990 CJRA. 
In fairness, the CJRA and its implementation had a number of positive as-
pects. Congress did structure the legislation in several ways that were meant to 
prevent or at least ameliorate disuniformity, complexity, expense, and delay. 
For example, Congress prescribed eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques 
that it envisioned most districts would adopt and it provided for pilot and dem-
onstration districts which were to employ similar procedures and EIDCs that 
were to experiment earlier than the remaining districts. 
Congress instituted an unprecedented nationwide self-analysis by all ninety-
four units of the federal civil justice system. The vision of reform proceeding 
from the bottom up inevitably promoted communication inside and among fed-
eral districts and with the state courts. Nearly all of the districts implemented 
some procedures, particularly in the broad areas of judicial case management, 
discovery, and ADR, which directly and perhaps successfully address cost and 
delay,217 although the efficacy of automatic disclosure remains unclear.218 
Certain complications that attended statutory implementation may have 
been attributable more to judicial interpretation and effectuation than to legisla-
tive drafting. The most important illustration is the twelfth procedural prescrip-
tion, which Congress seemed to consider a somewhat narrower grant of 
authority than did numerous federal judges.2 19 
Finally, the Act made considerable provision for analysis of the experimen-
tation that has proceeded and will be conducted. Congress commissioned a 
major study of the pilot districts by the RAND Corporation,220 and the Judicial 
Conference is currently evaluating the demonstration districts.221 
C. Conflicts Between the Two Acts 
The JIA and CJRA as written and implemented are not completely reconcil-
able and, indeed, are incompatible in important respects. When enacting the 
JIA, Congress accurately perceived local procedural proliferation to be a major 
problem that was contributing significantly to the erosion of uniformity, sim-
plicity, and trans-substantivity in federal civil procedure; facilitating expanded 
judicial discretion; and increasing the cost of and delay in civil litigation. Con-
gress prescribed institutions and assigned them duties which appeared respon-
217. This appears to be particularly true of the demonstration districts experimenting with these 
procedures. As to case management, see DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, ANNUAL AssESSMENT (1994); NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF Omo AssessMENT, supra note 214. As to ADR, see Memorandum from Kent Snapp and Davis 
Loupe to Judges in the Western District of Missouri (Jan. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Memorandum from 
Snapp & Loupe] (assessing ADR in the Western District of Missouri); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF Omo 
AssessMENT, supra note 214. 
218. See text accompanying notes 171-174 supra. 
219. See note 198 supra; text accompanying notes 196-201 supra. 
220. See Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation of 
the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. Rev. 1303 (1994); see also note 
95 supra and accompanying text 
221. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra; see also notes 213-215 supra and accompanying 
text 
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sive to the problem of local proliferation while simultaneously systematizing 
and opening to the public local procedural amendment processes. 
Congress apparently appreciated that restoring the primacy of the national 
rule revision process could address both the growth of local rules and the pro-
cedural tenets' deterioration. Legislative provision in the 1988 statute for open-
ing that process to increased public scrutiny was ostensibly intended to improve 
the quality of Federal Rules amendments developed, although Congress may 
have permitted the process to become overly politicized. The 1988 Act, there-
fore, in significant measure reaffirmed and sought to reinvigorate nearly all of 
the major procedural tenets, especially uniformity and simplicity, which 
animated the drafters of the original Federal Rules. The CJRA's implementa-
tion, however, effectively suspended efforts to reduce local procedural prolifer-
ation and was accommodated in several important ways by the 1993 revision 
process. 
Congress focused on different aspects of the civil justice system when it 
enacted the CJRA than it had when passing the JIA. It emphasized increased 
expense and delay in civil dispute resolution and may have thought that the 
uniform, simple, trans-substantive regime of the Federal Rules contributed to 
these difficulties. Congress' new perceptions of the most pressing complica-
tions in civil litigation led it to develop different strategies for treating them. 
Whereas Congress considered procedural proliferation problematic when pass-
ing the 1988 Act, Congress now encouraged local procedural innovation, prin-
cipally in areas, such as judicial case management, ADR, and discovery, which 
were responsive to the perceived sources of increased cost and delay. Congress 
created entities and assigned them duties that would maximize communication 
between the bench and bar, among the federal districts, and between the federal 
and state civil justice systems, in the hope of discovering, and generating con-
sensus about, procedures that would reduce expense and delay. The 1990 legis-
lation, accordingly, emphasized the 1938 drafters' tenets relating to 
expeditious, inexpensive dispute resolution, rather than uniformity, simplicity, 
trans-substantivity, and other process values. The tenets stressed find their 
clearest modem expression in the rise of managerial judging and the 1983 Fed-
eral Rules amendments. 
Numerous features of the 1990 statute and its implementation indicate that 
Congress may not have sufficiently thought through, and perhaps was unaware 
of, the conflicts with the JIA. Tensions between the two statutes are particu-
larly evident in the 1990 Act's approach to local experimentation. For exam-
ple, the CJRA encouraged districts to adopt procedures that conflict with the 
Federal Rules or the United States Code.222 Moreover, circuit judicial councils 
were probably reluctant to abrogate local procedures that the 1990 legislation 
seemingly authorized. The above developments, especially the accelerating 
erosion of national uniformity and simplicity' manifested less than a half-dec-
ade after the 1988 Act's passage, were ironic, because local procedural prolifer-
ation and inconsistency were important ills that the JIA sought to remedy. 
222. See text accompanying notes 196-198 supra. 
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These specific conflicts involving the two statutes may well be sympto-
matic of broader tensions. For example, the 1988 Act's attempts to reinvigo-
rate a uniform, simple, trans-substantive code of federal civil procedure conflict 
with the 1990 legislation's goal of applying local procedures that will reduce 
expense and delay, phenomena which are partly attributable to the uniform, 
simple, trans-substantive nature of the 1938 Federal Rules.223 
The CJRA's implementation and the 1993 changes in the Rules which per-
mitted local variation essentially supplanted efforts to treat local procedural 
proliferation, which means that procedural conditions remain as they were 
when Congress found them unacceptable in 1988. The difficulties of effectuat-
ing the CJRA and the 1993 amendments recounted above may well have addi-
tionally complicated the procedural state of affairs. Indeed, the tenets of 
uniformity, simplicity, and trans-substantivity which underlay the initial Fed-
eral Rules are more substantially undermined, while judicial discretion and 
costs and delay may be greater, than at any time since 1938. There are too 
many procedures, too many of which are too dissimilar, too complex, or too 
difficult to locate, understand, and obey. These developments have eroded the 
primacy of national procedures, effectively portending the demise of a nation-
ally applicable code of procedure, and have greatly complicated federal civil 
practice. 
Certain difficulties may have been attributable less to Congress or to the 
legislation as written than to other entities or to statutory implementation. For 
instance, the 1988 and 1990 Acts were apparently good faith efforts to treat 
substantial problems of modem civil litigation. Nevertheless, passage of the 
statutes, particularly of the 1990 Act, exacerbated longstanding interbranch ten-
sions which may be inevitable in the important area of court rulemaking, in-
volving as it does delicate issues of separation of powers and shared 
responsibilities.224 More specifically, Congress may have considered the 
CJRA's twelfth prescription a significantly narrower grant of authority to adopt 
inconsistent procedures than numerous districts have treated it.225 Further-
more, the Advisory Committee probably bears greater responsibility than Con-
gress for the complications created when the 1993 Federal Rules amendments 
took effect on the very date that many civil justice plans were due.226 
Congress apparently failed to consider completely the purposes, structure, 
and implementation of the 1990 Act, especially the legislation's reconciliation 
with the 1988 statute. It may have not appreciated that numerous important 
features of the two measures were in tension, much less that each statute pro-
223. Judges also need sufficient flexibility to adopt local procedures which can enable them to 
resolve local cases promptly, inexpensively, and fairly. See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local 
Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853, 868-71 (1989). 
224. These may be symptomatic of broader complications involving interbranch relations. Virtu-
ally all of Chief Justice Rehnquist's annual reports on the state of the federal judiciary reflect these 
tensions. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1993 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY; see 
also Mullenix, supra note 83, at 379-82, 399-400; William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The 
Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis. L. REv. l; text accompanying notes 75-78 supra. 
225. See note 198 supra; see also text accompanying notes 196-201 supra. 
226. See notes 138-169 supra and accompanying text; see also notes 114-118 supra. 
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moted different, frequently inconsistent procedural tenets. Insofar as Congress 
contemplated that the 1990 Act might conflict with and even suspend the 1988 
statute or frustrate the achievement of its basic objectives, Congress may have 
attempted to ameliorate those effects or may have decided that widespread ex-
perimentation with local procedures to decrease cost and delay was more im-
portant. In any event, Congress might have considered the 1988 legislation's 
suspension to be only a temporary disruption. 
In short, Congress pinpointed the problems of expense and delay in modem 
civil litigation and prescribed institutions and procedures for addressing those 
difficulties in the 1990 Act. Unfortunately, Congress may have not thoroughly 
thought through the statute's goals, operation, and implementation, particularly 
vis-a-vis the 1988 legislation. The treatment of these and numerous attendant 
complications examined above could necessitate institutional arrangements, 
specific procedures, procedural revision processes, and modes of experimenta-
tion different from those which Congress prescribed or envisioned in the two 
statutes. Indeed, efforts to capitalize on the Acts and legislative implementa-
tion by stressing, building on, and integrating their best aspects and rejecting or 
deemphasizing their worst features will apparently be more productive than 
attempts at comprehensive reconciliation of the legislation. 
As general propositions, the goals of increasing uniformity, simplicity, and 
trans-substantivity and of reducing cost and delay should continue to guide re-
form endeavors. These tenets, even as eroded, have served federal court 
judges, lawyers, and litigants well for a half-century, honoring important pro-
cess values, such as open court access and fairness. However, the tenets, as 
general precepts, are not inviolable, particularly when they conflict. For in-
stance, judicial application of special, different procedures to expedite routine, 
simple cases acknowledges that the need to decrease expense and delay can 
outweigh uniformity and trans-substantivity in certain situations. 
Efforts to capitalize on both statutes and legislative implementation lead to 
several more specific ideas. Future work should seek to restore the primacy of 
the national rule revision process while reattaining the local procedural status 
quo of 1988 and decreasing local rule proliferation. Moreover, civil justice 
reform procedures which have proved very effective in reducing expense or 
delay and which comport with important tenets must be incorporated in the 
Federal Rules. Measures that showed promise should be designated for addi-
tional experimentation. The institutions and procedural revision processes pre-
scribed in the 1990 statute should merge into those that existed or were created 
in 1988, while the 1990 Act's experimentation methods should be replaced 
with an amendment to Federal Rule 83 analogous to the 1991 proposed 
revision. 227 
The next Part offers recommendations for the future, relating to institutions, 
procedures, processes, and experimentation. Although Congress passed the 
1988 and 1990 statutes and is the ultimate procedural policymaker, my pre-
227. See text accompanying notes 175-176 supra; see also text accompanying notes 229-261 
infra. 
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scriptions are directed to all relevant decisionmakers, including national and 
local rule revisors and federal judges as well as Congress. Existing individuals 
and entities can implement nearly all of the recommendations without legisla-
tion. Congress may want to consider the establishment of a national commis-
sion on federal civil procedure, which could decide how to implement specific 
suggestions and which would have the requisite independence and resources to 
assemble, analyze, and develop additional ideas for improving twenty-first cen-
tury civil procedure.22s 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Institutions 
1. National rule revision entities. 
The national entities should regain and maintain primary responsibility for 
revising the procedures that govern civil litigation. These entities have served 
the courts, Congress, lawyers, parties, and the public well for many years, most 
recently in the amendment process that yielded the 1993 revisions, and they are 
repositories of a wealth of accumulated expertise. The entities can best revive, 
sustain, and enhance procedure's fundamental tenets, particularly uniformity 
and simplicity, while making exceptions as needed. The institutions' national 
perspective enables them to develop procedural improvements that consider the 
best interests of the civil justice system as a whole. Entities such as the Judicial 
Conference are well-equipped to identify those procedures which warrant ap-
plication in all ninety-four districts or which appear promising enough to justify 
deviation from the Federal Rules for purposes of experimentation or of treating 
peculiar local conditions.229 For decades, Congress has reviewed and modified 
Federal Rules amendments, but Congress does not oversee local procedural 
changes. In contrast, most local rules committees, appointed by judges in the 
ninety-four districts to advise them on procedural revisions, will be more con-
cerned about local needs than about national uniformity or simplicity.230 
Among those entities-the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, 
the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and the Congress-responsible for 
national rule revision, the Advisory Committee should retain major responsibil-
ity for developing proposals for procedural change. The bodies above that 
Committee in the rule revision hierarchy, while remaining involved, should de-
fer to the institutions below them, which are more attuned to the practical ef-
fects of rule revision. The Court and Congress should continue to play limited 
roles as ultimate gatekeepers, rejecting, modifying, or remanding procedural 
proposals that are clearly inappropriate. These suggestions respect historical 
228. For example, such a commission should have a staff which has no other responsibilities. A 
helpful model is the recent National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal. For background 
on the Commission's work, see Symposium, Disciplining the Federal Judiciary, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1 
(1993) (collecting papers by consultants to the Commission). 
229. See Keeton, supra note 223; see also Cohn Letter, supra note 46. 
230. See note 185 supra and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra note 2, at 1401 n.50 
(observing that 94 local rule revision entities are more difficult to monitor than one Advisory 
Committee). 
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practice and are commensurate with the apparent interest, expertise, and re-
sources, including time and staff, that the entities possess and can devote to rule 
revision. The recommendations appropriately accommodate conflicting con-
cerns, such as the need for congressional and Supreme Court involvement to 
legitimate court rulemaking and for relatively expeditious procedural revision 
which participation by a multiplicity of institutions complicates. The limited 
roles suggested for the Court and the Congress are reinforced by the Justices' 
extremely deferential review of the 1993 amendments and by Congress' rather 
erratic treatment of that package.231 
Additional practicing attorneys should be included as members of the 
Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee to counter the perception 
that the revisors' work product is overly solicitous of the needs of the federal 
bench.232 Numerous observers assert that these entities' relative solicitude is 
partially attributable to their recent historical composition, which overwhelm-
ingly consists of federal judges.233 
2. Local procedural revision entities. 
With respect to local procedural revision, the advisory groups and circuit 
review committees created under the CJRA should merge with the local rules 
committees and circuit judicial councils required under the JIA and earlier leg-
islation. 234 Too many institutions serving analogous functions currently par-
ticipate in local revision processes. Moreover, the newer entities have already 
achieved their principal purpose, facilitating widespread experimentation, and 
the older institutions can competently assume their remaining responsibilities. 
Those districts that have not appointed local rules committees should promptly 
do so. All committees should have balanced composition and should recruit 
civil justice reform advisory group members for their expertise.235 These local 
rules committees can provide valuable assistance to district judges in formulat-
231. See notes 117-118, 157-162 supra and accompanying texts. Congress' failure to reconcile 
the 1988 and 1990 Acts or at least to think completely through the CJRA's implementation implicates its 
institutional competence as a procedural policymaker and may support its adopting a more circum-
scribed role in the future. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Proce-
dural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 800-05, 817-18 (1993); see also Burbank, supra note 168; 
Colloquy, Perspectives on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3 (1992) (essays debating the 
strengths and weaknesses of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, governing supplemental jurisdiction, which Congress 
passed in 1990); note 54 supra and accompanying text (describing congressional revision of Rule 4). 
232. See Tobias, supra note 115, at 897; see also notes 145-152 supra and accompanying text 
(describing the Advisory Committee's reversal on automatic disclosure twice in two months, despite the 
organized bar's strident opposition). 
233. See Tobias, supra note 115, at 897; see also S. 2212, 103d Cong., 2d Sess (1994) (bill 
requiring that rule revision committees have a majority of members of the practicing bar because the 
committees lack balance). But see 1993 Proposed Amendments, supra note 48, at 329-30 (reflecting 
recently revised composition to include more practitioners on advisory committees on bankruptcy, civil, 
criminal, and evidentiary rules). 
234. See texts accompanying notes 63-69, 84-108, 184-189 supra. 
235. For instance, advisory group members could contribute an appreciation of the history of civil 
justice reform efforts, could help promote bench-bar exchange, and could develop strategies for integrat-
ing civil justice reform into future procedural endeavors. 
July 1994] IMPROVING THE ACTS 1629 
ing local procedural proposals, can help foster consensus on the best local pro-
cedures, and can serve as constructive liaisons between the bench and bar. 
All of the judges in each district, in consultation with local rules commit-
tees, should have primary responsibility for developing procedural changes, 
and individual judges should defer as much as possible to those institutions, 
rather than develop individual-judge procedures. Judges working with local 
rules committees should have the expertise, understanding of local circum-
stances, and appreciation of the need for national uniformity and simplicity that 
are required to develop local procedures that restore, maintain, and enhance 
those tenets and which reduce cost and delay and decrease judicial discretion, 
when warranted. The judges, the local rules committees, and the circuit judi-
cial councils should reassume and discharge the duties relating to local proce-
dural proliferation imposed by the JIA that the CJRA, in effect, suspended. 
The Local Rules Project, with its wealth of information on local procedures and 
its substantial expertise regarding local procedural proliferation, can assist and 
coordinate efforts aimed at limiting local proliferation.236 
B. Procedures 
Restoring, sustaining, and enhancing the tenets of uniformity, simplicity, 
and trans-substantivity while reducing judicial discretion and cost and delay 
require preferring Federal Rules over local rules, local rules over individual-
judge procedures, and written procedures over unwritten ones. These proposi-
tions, as general precepts, are not absolutes and allow for variation, particularly 
when the tenets are in tension. For instance, it may be necessary to sacrifice a 
measure of national uniformity or simplicity to experiment locally with tech-
niques that promise to limit expense or delay. When ascertaining the propriety 
of applying specific procedures, it will be important to employ a finely cali-
brated analysis which considers the tenets and additional significant process 
values, such as open court access.237 
1. Local procedures. 
All local procedures, especially those of individual judges, such as general, 
standing, special and minute orders, and unwritten practices, that are unneces-
sary or inconsistent should be eliminated.238 The maximum number of local 
procedures that remain ought to be included in local rules. Every local proce-
dure should be in written form. However, courts must retain some flexibility to 
experiment and to apply measures which efficaciously treat problems that are 
peculiar to local dockets. 239 
236. See notes 38-48 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Project's efforts, including its 
suggestion that local procedures be numbered consistently). 
237. See Robel, supra note 70, at 1484 (suggesting a similar test premised on local legal cultures 
for experimentation with inconsistent procedures). 
238. See text accompanying notes 45-46, 66-67, 104, 196-198 supra; FED. R. ClV. P. 83 (permit-
ting district courts to promulgate local rules not inconsistent with the Federal Rules and individual 
judges to "regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with" the Federal Rules or local rules). 
239. See note 223 supra and accompanying text. 
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There should also be provision for procedures which were tested under the 
1990 Act. Those procedures that clearly reduced expense or delay while re-
specting additional important tenets should be incorporated into the Federal 
Rules.240 Other procedures which showed promise of decreasing cost or delay 
but were not effective enough to be implemented nationwide should be desig-
nated for more experimentation. Experimentation could be authorized under a 
modified version of the 1991 proposal to amend Rule 83 or under legislation 
similar to that providing for court-annexed arbitration.241 
2. National procedures. 
I offer some general suggestions with examples derived principally from 
the 1993 Federal Rules amendments, subject to the caveat that they are in the 
early stages of implementation. The 1993 revision of Federal Rule 11 has ap-
parently had the intended effect of reducing incentives to invoke the provision, 
thereby decreasing satellite litigation and effecting concomitant reductions in 
cost, delay, and chilling effects.242 The difficulty of implementing automatic 
disclosure, the controversial nature of the provision adopted, and the limited 
application and evaluation of the procedure to date complicate definitive con-
clusions regarding its efficacy. Anecdotal evidence indicates that disclosure's 
effectiveness is context-specific.243 It is advisable, therefore, to refine the pro-
cedure by confining its application to those contexts in which disclosure works 
best. 
Other, less controversial procedures, such as those in the broad fields of 
case management and ADR, appear to yield cost or time savings, although con-
clusive determinations must await additional experimentation and evaluation 
under the CJRA.244 However, the local-option mechanism, which was in-
cluded in the 1993 Federal Rules amendments primarily as a temporary expedi-
ent to accommodate local experimentation with civil justice reform, should be 
240. See, e.g., Memorandum from Snapp & Loupe, supra note 217 (describing successful efforts 
to implement ADR in Missouri). See generally Debra Cassens Moss, Reformers Tout ADR Programs, 
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 28. The 1990 statute expressly requires that the Judicial Conference make this 
determination as to the six principles and guidelines prescribed. See notes 93-95 supra and accompany-
ing text. It is now difficult to identify definitively which procedures warrant enforcement in the ninety-
four districts because their assessment has not been completed. Nonetheless, it presently appears that 
some principles, guidelines, and techniques in the broad areas of case management, ADR, and discovery 
will reduce cost or delay and be consistent with the remaining tenets and other significant process 
values. See notes 217-218 supra and accompanying text. Those procedures not statutorily prescribed 
which similarly reduce expense or delay and comport with the tenets should also be included in the 
Federal Rules. 
241. See notes 175-176 supra and accompanying text (discussing proposed Rule 83); note 58 
supra (discussing court-annexed arbitration); see also notes 258-261 infra and accompanying text (dis-
cussing experimentation). 
242. These assertions are premised on an informal survey of reported and unreported Rule 11 
opinions issued since December 1993, and on conversations with many individuals involved in federal 
court litigation. 
243. See notes 152, 173-174 supra and accompanying texts (suggesting that disclosure functions 
more efficaciously in relatively routine, simple cases rather than complex cases, such as products liabil-
ity litigation). 
244. See notes 217-218 supra and accompanying text. 
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eliminated.245 The technique has created significant problems of disuniformity 
and complexity and concomitantly has increased expense and delay, even as the 
flexibility that it afforded has facilitated experimentation. 246 
C. Revision Processes 
1. National revision processes. 
As between the national and local rule revision processes, the national pro-
cess should be accorded primary responsibility for changing procedures that 
govern federal civil litigation. This national process has served the public very 
well for more than a half-century, and it can best attend to the revitalization, 
maintenance, and enhancement of the fundamental tenets of federal civil proce-
dure and to the needs of all ninety-four districts in developing proposals for 
procedural change. 247 
It is difficult to evaluate precisely the national revision process instituted in 
the 1988 Act, because the proceedings that led to the 1993 amendments were 
peculiar in several important respects.248 As a general matter, the process, pre-
mised on a weak administrative law model of federal agency rulemaking, 
seemed reasonably effective. The statutory requirements providing for in-
creased public participation in the process encouraged public input which in-
formed the procedural changes developed and apparently promoted public 
acceptability and accountability.249 For example, written comments and oral 
testimony from the public seemingly persuaded the Advisory Committee to 
make changes in the Rule 11 preliminary draft that improved it.250 Unfortu-
nately, the greater openness and public involvement also imposed disadvan-
tages, such as the costs of treating duplicative or incorrect public input and the 
potential to politicize the process which can compromise merits-based deci-
sionmaking about procedures.251 
245. See notes 177-179 supra and accompanying text. 
246. See notes 161-170, 179 supra and accompanying texts; see also notes 258-261 infra and 
accompanying text (describing more effective methods of experimentation). 
247. For example, the process is best able to identify proposals which are sufficiently efficacious 
to warrant nationwide application. 
248. See text accompanying note 109 supra. 
249. See notes 114-116, 125-127, 145-148 supra and accompanying texts; see also Roger C. 
Cramton, The lVhy, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 
60 GEo. LJ. 525, 528-29, 531-32 (1972) (offering similar observations in the administrative agency 
context); Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency 
Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 906, 
941-45 (1982) (same). 
250. See, e.g., texts accompanying notes 114-116, 125-127 supra. 
251. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 249, at 536 (identifying "overlapping and even frivolous rep-
resentation [and] proliferation of issues" as some of the problems associated with active public partici-
pation in agency rulemaking); Tobias, supra note 249, at 946-47 (discussing costs of treating duplicative 
or incorrect public input in administrative proceedings); see also Mullenix, supra note 54, at 798-802, 
830-57 {discussing how increased openness can compromise procedural decisionmaking). Thus, while 
proper accommodation may have been reached, additional tinkering with administrative models may be 
warranted. Examples are questions involving timing, such as the length of the entire process and the 
time that individual entities have to consider proposals, as well as the frequency with which procedures 
should be changed. 
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It is now appropriate to consider whether the assimilation of national proce-
dural revision to federal administrative agency rulemaking should be more 
comprehensively and candidly realized. For instance, the procedures for secur-
ing, evaluating, and applying public input might improve if regularized under a 
clear, formal process for the submission of public comment to the Supreme 
Court.252 There is also an important need to premise more Federal Rules 
amendment proposals on actual experience through careful experimentation 
and rigorous evaluation of procedural efficacy with the systematic collection, 
analysis, and synthesis of relevant empirical data. The unfortunate experience 
with automatic disclosure and the problems with the 1983 amendment of Rule 
11 and its subsequent application that led to the 1993 amendment illustrate the 
importance of having information on how procedures operate in practice at the 
outset.253 
2. Local revision processes. 
Many of the ideas relating to the institutions responsible for local proce-
dural change and to local procedures apply to the local procedural revision 
processes.254 As discussed above, the major priority should be instituting 
processes for reviewing all local procedures, abrogating those measures that are 
unnecessary or inconsistent, limiting the number of local procedures and in-
cluding as many as possible in local rules, and reducing each local procedure to 
writing.255 
Much I have said regarding the national revision process similarly applies 
to implementation of the JIA's requirement that local procedural revision 
processes be systematized and opened to public scrutiny. A number of districts 
have only recently instituted formal procedural revision procedures, while few 
courts have conducted proceedings, and civil justice reform under the 1990 Act 
suspended those processes in other districts. Nevertheless, some courts have 
completed proceedings that appeared effective, and a tiny number of districts 
capitalized on the CJRA's implementation to improve their local rules.256 
As with the national revision process, the 1988 Act's requirements gov-
erning local procedural amendment seemed to reach appropriate accommoda-
tion among the applicable factors, such as the need for cogent public input to 
improve procedures and the need to avoid undue politicization of revision 
processes.257 These similarities between the national and local processes sug-
gest that recommendations regarding national amendment have analogous local 
application. For example, local processes should be open to public involve-
252. See Tobias, supra note 113. 
253. See notes 138-141 supra and accompanying text. 
254. See notes 234-236, 238-241 supra and accompanying texts. 
255. See text accompanying note 238 supra. 
256. The Middle District of Georgia and the Southern District of West Virginia apparently capital-
ized on opportunities afforded by civil justice reform to review and revise their local rules. See, e.g., 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, PLAN TO MINIMIZE COST AND DELAY OF 
CrvIL LmGATION 5 (1993); Tobias, supra note 103, at 104 & n.113 (discussing local rules in the South-
ern District of West Virginia). 
257. See notes 248-251 supra and accompanying text. 
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ment. This means that all of the judges in specific districts should work closely 
with the local rules committees in developing suggested procedural improve-
ments while affording the public and the bar notice of the proposed changes 
and formally soliciting public input. The judges and committees should also 
capitalize on all relevant civil justice reform efforts by, for instance, continuing 
the informative bench-bar dialogue and the exchange of ideas among the dis-
tricts which pervaded the CJRA's implementation. 
D. Experimentation 
Future experimentation should proceed pursuant to a systematic, measured 
approach modeled on the 1991 proposal to amend Federal Rule 83 which the 
Advisory Committee withdrew in deference to civil justice reform efforts.258 
That proposal would have permitted districts, which secured Judicial Confer-
ence approval, to experiment for not greater than five years with inconsistent 
local procedures.259 Some subset of the ninety-four federal districts might 
serve as laboratories for testing procedures that appear sufficiently promising to 
warrant application in additional courts or nationally.260 
All of the judges working with local rules committees in each district could 
propose and develop experimental projects. The judges and committees might 
rely upon efforts to implement the CJRA and reform endeavors in the state civil 
justice systems when identifying potential procedures for testing and when de-
signing experiments. They should also draw upon the wealth of information 
and technical expertise that is available in the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Judicial Conference 
committees, especially the Court Administration and Case Management 
Committee. 
Equally important as vigorous, systematic experimentation is rigorous eval-
uation. The districts should develop appropriate evaluative criteria, establish 
proper baselines, employ correct techniques for assessing procedures' effects, 
and analyze procedures with sufficient rigor in diverse situations for enough 
time to afford an accurate sense of their efficacy. The RAND Corporation's 
study of experimentation in the pilot districts provides an instructive model of 
evaluation.26 1 When experimentation with and assessment of specific proce-
dures in particular federal districts show that they warrant broader application, 
the Advisory Committee and the Judicial Conference should ascertain whether 
the procedures need additional testing or are sufficiently efficacious to be im-
plemented nationally. When more experimentation is indicated, the entities 
should calculate exactly how much is necessary and designate the appropriate 
circumstances for that activity. If the Committee and the Conference deem 
258. See notes 175-176 supra and accompanying texL See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules 
as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1567 (1991); Laurens Walker, 
Peifecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1988, at 67. 
259. See notes 175-176 supra and accompanying text. 
260. The proposal prescribed no standard for approving proposals to experiment. 
261. See Dunworth & Kakalik, supra note 220. 
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nationwide application proper, the Advisory Committee ought to draft a propo-
sal for consideration in the national rule revision process. 
Many factors support adoption of an approach similar to the one described_ 
above. It relies substantially on those entities which have great expertise relat-
ing to experimentation and capitalizes on civil justice reform efforts. The 
model accommodates a number of often conflicting needs. These include the 
flexibility to conduct experimentation that will lead to the discovery of proce-
dures which reinvigorate the Federal Rules' basic tenets while minimally dis-
rupting daily dispute resolution. Moreover, the course of action is deliberately 
structured narrowly, to minimize certain difficulties created by the CJRA's im-
plementation, even as the approach capitalizes on the legislation by developing 
experiments from the bottom up and by using the information that the Act 
generated. For example, the ability to control the number of districts that are 
simultaneously experimenting with similar procedures will enable districts to 
build on prior testing and to facilitate effective evaluation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990 were important efforts to improve federal civil procedure. Very different 
visions of the problems with modem civil litigation and of the solutions to 
those difficulties animated the 1988 and 1990 statutes. There has been consid-
erable tension between the two Acts, in part because the drafters of the CJRA 
apparently did not think completely through its implementation and seemingly 
made little effort to integrate the legislations' effectuation. Notwithstanding 
these tensions and other complications which have attended each statute and its 
implementation, the JIA and CJRA have afforded numerous benefits. If those 
responsible for the current state of federal civil procedure follow the sugges-
tions above, they may now capitalize on the two statutes and their effectuation 
to improve that procedure in the twenty-first century. 
